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CAN ApPROPRIATION RIDERS SPEED
OUR EXIT FROM

IRAQ?

By CHARLES TIEFER •

I.

INTRODUCTION

If the President loses centrist American political support for continuing
the war in Iraq, members of Congress might employ their most legally potent,
yet controversial, tool to speed our exit, or at least to change policy. Namely,
they can attach conditions-typically in the form of provisions added to the
war funding and Iraq aid appropriations, known as "riders" because of how
they "ride" on the underlying bill-pushing the military ground combat
operations toward an earlier exit. I
Congress enacts an appropriation bill for funding the continuation of
the Iraq war at least once every year and also enacts funding bills for military
training, reconstruction, and other aid for the government of Iraq.2
Congressional procedure allows proponents of policy changes to offer riders
for these funding bills. Sponsors started pushing certain riders in 2003 to
3
convert Iraq reconstruction aid into World Bank loans instead of grants: in
spring 2005 to forbid torture or inhuman treatment of detainees/ and in

Professor, University of Baltimore Law School; B.A., summa cum laude, Columbia
College 1974; J.D., magna cum laude, Harvard Law School 1977. The author appreciates the
assistance of William C. Banks, Neal Devins, Louis Fisher, Michael Glennon, Peter RavenHansen, and George Van Cleve, and of his research assistants Melyssa Morey and Andrea King.
The responsibility for all views and errors is my own.
I For general treatments of the subject, see WILLIAM C. BANKS & PETER RAVENHANSEN, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW AND THE POWER OF THE PURSE (1994); STEPHEN DYCUS,
ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW (3d ed. 2002); LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER
(2d ed. 2004); THOMAS M. FRANCK & MICHAEL J. GLENNON, FOREIGN RELATIONS AND
NATIONAL SECURITY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND SIMULATIONS (2d ed. 1993); MICHAEL
GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY (1990); LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 1996) (all documenting and analyzing the historic
relationship between the executive and legislative branches in the context of war-making
powers).
2 The Open Society publishes Iraq's budget online. Iraq Revenue Watch, Monitoring Iraq
Reconstruction Funds, Contracts, Oil, http://www.iraqrevenuewatch.org (last visited March 22,
2006). For a prediction of the large future expenses for training Iraqi security forces, see Rick
Maze, War Costs May Surpass $500 Billion, Report Warns, ARMy TIMES, Oct. 24, 2005, at 11.
3 Aid began at the time of occupation. See generally, James Thuo Gathii, Foreign and

Other Economic Rights Upon Conquest and Under Occupation: Iraq in Comparative and
Historical Perspective, 25 U. PA. 1. INT'L ECON. L. 491 (2004); John Yoo, Iraq Reconstruction
and the Law of Occupation, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL 'y 7 (2004) (treating generally the
legal situation of occupied Iraq).
4 CHARLES TIEFER, VEERING RIGHT 210-23 (2004).
5 Eric Lichtblau, Congress Adopts Restriction on Treatment of Detainees, N.Y. TIMES,
May 11, 2005, at A16. This provision is discussed in Part IV.A.l, infra. For general
background, see, for example, Diane Marie Amann, Abu Ghraib, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2085
(2005).
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summer 2005 for troop withdrawals from Iraq.6 The Iraq-policy riders of 2003
and 2005 did not pass, and only the "McCain Amendment" rider about
detainee treatment did. 7 Nevertheless, these early efforts highlighted that this
was one procedural way in which a portion of the majority party in Congress,
representing districts and states insistent upon a different Iraq policy, could
join with the minority party on moderate proposals that affect wartime policy.8
Even a congressional majority party leadership supporting the President,
although able to fend off most other efforts to change Iraq policies
legislatively, may not be able to prevent the offering and passage of Iraq
appropriation riders. 9
To illustrate its points concretely, this Article explores the issues
surrounding Iraq riders using three examples, each of which raises a different
kind of dispute. The hypothetical riders consist of two war funding riders,
regarding withdrawal and policy respectively, and an aid rider regarding Iraqi
governance. The focus of this Article is not the undoubtedly interesting policy
and political issues raised by such riders, but rather the constitutional debate
over the powers of the Congress and the President. During and after
congressional consideration of such riders, the riders' proponents will base
Congress' right to affect wartime policy via appropriation riders upon the
plenary nature,IO venerable history, II and contemporary significance l2 of
Congress' power of the purse.13 Conversely, the riders' o~ponents will raise, in
addition to policy and political contentions, a classic 4 and contemporaryl5

6 151 CONGo REc. H4767-68 (daily ed. June 16, 2005) (section (a) of the Pelosi
Amendment).
7 Detainee Treatment Act of2005, Pub. L. 109-148, § 801, 119 Stat. 2739, 2744 (2005).
8 See. e.g., Mark Tushnet, Controlling Executive Power in the War on Terrorism, 118
HARV. L. REv. 2673, 2678 (2005) (examining the procedures and practices of Congress).
9 See, e.g., CHARLES TIEFER, CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 987 (1989)
(discussing the abortion and other limitation riders that threatened to take control of the House
floor in the early 1980s).
JO Louis Fisher, How Tightly Can Congress Draw the Purse Strings?, 83 AM. J. INT'L L.
758 (1989) (discussing the constitutionality of legislative control over foreign affairs in the
context of the Iran-Contra affair); Michael J. Glennon, Strengthening the War Powers
Resolution: The Case for Purse-Strings Restrictions, 60 MINN. L. REv. I (1975) (suggesting a
constitutional basis for strengthening Congress' powers in the context of Vietnam); Raoul
Berger, War-Making Power of the President, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 29, 78-79 (1972) (same).
II See, e.g., Jules Lobel, Covert War and Congressional Authority: Hidden War and
Forgotten Power, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1035 (1986) (discussing Congress' historical and
constitutional authority to authorize private forces to fight on behalf of the United States).
12 FRANCIS D. WORMUTH & EDWTN B. FIRMAGE, To CHAIN THE DOG OF WAR: THE
WAR POWER OF CONGRESS IN HISTORY AND LAW (2d ed. 1989) (discussing congressional and
executive war-making from the founding through Vietnam).
13 Kate Stith, Congress' Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343 (1988) (describing the
contours of Congress' power of the purse).
14 Robert H. Bork, Erosion of the President's Power in Foreign Affairs, 68 WASH. U. L.Q.
693 (1990) (suggesting that executive war-making power faced an increasing threat of
legislative intrusion); J. Gregory Sidak, The President's Power of the Purse, 1989 DUKE L.J.
1162 (discussing the limits of congressional appropriations and the extent of executive spending
power).
15 John C.
Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original
Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REv. 167 (1996) (analyzing modern war powers
from an originalist perspective).
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argument of maximal presidential war powersl6 that disputes the legitimacy of
l7
changing policy through riders. They will argue from the President's own
textual authority as Commander in Chief in an authorized, legal war lS and will
cite past presidential pronouncements. 19 They will also invoke the more
2o
general "executive power" clause. The Justice Department adumbrated such
arguments in 2006 in a legal memorandum supporting the President's wartime
power to authorize warrantless eavesdropping of communications to the United
States, although that eavesdropping would be proscribed by the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act. 21
While even supporters of presidential power would concede that
Congress could plainly and simply cut off funds for the war22-that is, stop
funding and thereby require a total and abrupt (if funds run out rapidly)
withdrawal-Congress will be loath to take that step. Conditions, by contrast
with cutoffs, impose measured schedules and relatively nuanced policy
changes rather than totally and abruptly stopping the funding. The President's
supporters would treat Congress' use of conditions, not cutoffs, as a reversion
to what they would deem President-doubting, congressional-micromanaging
24
syndromes after the Vietnam War and Iran-Contra, assertedly23 out ofplace in
16 See, e.g., Philip Bobbitt, War Powers: An Essay on John Hart Ely's War and
Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and Its Aftermath, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1364
(1994) (examining limits on congressional war-making power and executive authority to
override Congress); J. Gregory Sidak, To Declare War, 41 DUKE L.J. 27 (1991) (outlining the
contextual factors that merit a congressional declaration of war, in the context of the Gulf War).
17 See, e.g., John C. Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1639
(2002) (offering textual support for a flexible view of the President's war-making powers as an
alternative to a "pro-Congress" position).
IS By "legal war" I mean (sufficient) authorization by Congress. The interesting question
of the war's status in international law is a separate matter. See, e.g., Mahmoud Hmoud, The
Use of Force Against Iraq: Occupation and Security Council Resolution 1483,36 CORN. INT'L
L.J. 435 (2004) (rejecting the United States arguments for the legality of the war); Sean D.
Murphy, Assessing the Legality of Invading Iraq, 92 GEO. L.J. 173 (2004) (fmding the
justification of the United States attack on Iraq in terms of Security Council resolutions dating
back to the invasion of Kuwait unpersuasive); Robert F. Turner, Operation Iraqi Freedom:
Legal and Policy Considerations, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 765 (2004) (justifying the attack
on Iraq as consistent with the United Nations Charter and international law); A. Mark Weisburd,
The War in Iraq and the Dilemma of Controlling the International Use of Force, 39 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 521, 522 (2004) (arguing attack on Iraq was a violation of United Nations Charter).
19 Executive pronouncements are collected in Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, The
President's Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorist
Organizations and the Nations that Harbor or Support Them, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 488
(2002). Although many of those statements occurred in contexts in which they did not justify a
challenged executive intervention, some did. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, OFFICE OF THE
LEGAL ADVISER, THE LEGALITY OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE DEFENSE OF VIETNAM, 112
CONGo REc. 5504 (1966).
20 Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994) (making a constitutional case for a strong unitary executive);
Robert F. Turner, War and the Forgotten Executive Power Clause of the Constitution: A Review
Essay of John Hart Ely's War and Responsibility, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 903 (1994) (offering
historical support for broad deference to the President in matters considered executive).
21 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National
President
(Jan.
19,
2006),
Security
Agency
Described
by
the
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/whitepaperonnsalegalauthorit ies.pdf.
22 Even strong believers in Presidential power would let Congress prevent or stop an
intervention by denying it funding. John C. Y 00, Kosovo, War Powers, and the Multilateral
Future, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1673, 1704 (2000).
23 But see David Abramowitz, The President, the Congress and the Use of Force: Legal
and Political Considerations in Authorizing Use of Force Against International Terrorism, 43
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the post-9/11 world. 25 In addition, presidential supporters would counter
26
Congress' authority to place terms on appropriations by citing both case law
29
and commentary27 about the "unconstitutional conditions,,28 doctrine.
30
The next Part of this Article begins with general background and
consideration of the presidential and congressional positions in constitutional
debates and actions regarding Iraq war riders. The Article moves from English
and colonial history to the most important congressional actions in the recent
past. In particular, the Article discusses congressional actions regarding the
3l
32
34
Vietnam War in the 1970s and the conflict J3 over the Boland Amendments
HARV. INT'L L.J. 71 (2002) (discussing how actual compromise on the September 14, 2001
resolution moderated presidential power).
24 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the
War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REv. 2047 (2005) (implicitly responding to the Vietnam
syndrome by fmding the post-9I11 congressional resolution a wide-open blank check for
presidential use of force); Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 19 at 491-92 (rejecting the view, much
accepted after the Vietnam War, that only Congress can authorize war).
25 Vice President Dick Cheney has been a major voice in arguing against congressional
restriction of presidential war powers, and has naturally urged this in the post-9/11 period. Bob
Woodward, Cheney Upholds Power of the Presidency: Vice President Praises Bush as Strong,
Decisive Leader Who Has Helped Restore Office, WASH. POST, Jan. 20,2005, at A07.
26 United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 307 (1946) (demonstrating counsel's
unsuccessful defense of the challenged provision as an exercise of Congress' appropriation
power); United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1872) (challenged proviso was in
appropriation).
27 Executive branch supporters apply the term to appropriation limitations that assertedly
infringe on the President's constitutional authority. H. Jefferson Powell, The President's
Authority Over Foreign Affairs: An Executive Branch Perspective, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
527,551-54 (1999); William H. Taft, The Boundaries Between the Executive, the Legislative
and the Judicial Branches of the Government, 25 YALE L.J. 599,612 (1916).
28 "A series of attorney general opinions, and the concept of unconstitutional conditions,
refute the notion that the appropriations power can be a valid basis for broad congressional
claims of absolute plenary authority." John Norton Moore, Do We Have An Imperial
Congress?, 43 U. MIAMI L. REv. 139,145--46 (1988) (footnotes omitted).
29 The common and accepted application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
concerns individuals' entitlement to receive government benefits without having to accept the
condition of surrendering their constitutional rights. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional
Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1413, 1415 (1989); Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal
Spending & the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REv. 1103, 1120-23 (1987) (considering the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine as covering a broad range of privilege recipients, public
and private); John D. French, Unconstitutional Conditions: An Analysis, 50 GEO. L.J. 234, 236239 (1961).
30 Note, Congress, the President, and the Power to Commit Forces to Combat, 81 HARV.
L. REv. 1771 (1968) (comparing congressional and presidential war-making powers in the
context of Vietnam).
3l John H. Ely, The American War in Indochina, Part I: The (Troubled) Constitutionality
of the War They Told Us About, 42 STAN. L. REv. 877 (1990) (discussing the constitutionality
of the war in Indochina in retrospect).
32 John H. Ely, The American War in Indochina, Part II: The Unconstitutionality of the
War They Didn't Tell Us About, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1093 (1990) (further discussion of the
constitutionality of the war in Indochina).
33 Even before the Contra issues, in 1979-84, I served as assistant Senate legal counsel
and had the opportunity informally to assist the Senate Foreign Relations Committee when it
made the key decisions about authorizing the Lebanon intervention of 1983 that became the
Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution, Pub. L. No. 98-1119, 97 Stat. 805 (1983). See
CHARLES TIEFER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PRESIDENCY 123-24 (1994); Note, The Future of the
War Powers Resolution, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1407,1425 n.199 (1984).
34 HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER
AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFF AJR (1990) (highlighting the ways in which the breakdown in the
distribution of constitutional authority led to the Iran-Contra crisis).

2006

Can Appropriation Riders Speed Our Exit/rom Iraq?

295

during the Iran-Contra controversy in the mid-1980s,35 which, among others,36 I
38
37
was privileged to see during my time inside Congress.
Further illumination as to war powers has continued since then,39 in the
40
course of the military interventions of the administrations of President George
41
42
43
H. W. Bush and President Clinton from the mid-1990s to the 1999 bombing
44
5
As for conditions on aid to allied
campaign in Kosovo and Serbia:
governments facing insurgencies, the Central American aid provisions of the
6
1980s provide some key insights:

35 G. Hr. Wolohojian, Note, The Boland Amendments and Foreign Affairs Deference, 88
COLUM. L. REv. 1534 (1988) (arguing in the context of Iran-Contra that judicial deference to
the executive on matters of foreign affairs should not apply to statutory interpretation).
36 As Solicitor of the House of Representatives from 1984-95, I personally represented the
House of Representatives in a number of constitutional cases on national security. See, e.g.,
Am. Foreign Servo Ass'n V. Garfinkel, 490 U.S. 13 (1989) (vacating ruling striking down as
unconstitutional a classified information provision in an appropriation bill), on remand, 732 F.
Supp. 13 (D.D.C. 1990). For a previous article drawing on my role as congressional counsel,
see Charles Tiefer, The FAS Proposal: Valid Check or Unconstitutional Veto? in FIRST USE OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, WHO DECIDES? (Peter Raven-Hansen ed.,
1987), reprinted in FRANCK & GLENNON, supra note 1, at 728-32.
37 As Special Deputy Chief Counsel on the House Iran-Contra Committee, 1 co-authored
the chapter in the committee report on the Boland Amendments. Report of the Congressional
Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, S. REp. NO. 216, H.R. REp. NO. 100-433
(1987). For a previous discussion drawing on that service, see George W. Van Cleve & Charles
Tiefer, Navigating the Shoals of Use Immunity and Secret International Enterprises in Major
Congressional Investigations: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 55 Mo. L. REv. 43 (1990).
38 I filed the amicus brief for the House Leadership Group. Am. Foreign Servo Ass'n V.
Garfmkel, 109 S. Ct. 1693 (1989). The brief addressed the constitutionality of the appropriation
rider in that case, while also arguing the mootness issue that the Court accepted. The issues
were nicely treated in Michael Glennon, Publish and Perish: Congress's Effort to Snip Snepp,
Before and AFSA, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 163 (1989).
39 See Michael D. Ramsey, Presidential Declarations of War, 37 u.c. DAVIS L. REv. 321
(2003) (providing a survey of how modern presidential announcements of commitment of U.S.
forces have amounted to--in defmition and function-formal declarations of war).
40 For a strong criticism of presidential claims to war powers culminating in criticisms of
both the Bush and Clinton administrations' positions, see Louis Fisher, Unchecked Presidential
Wars, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1637 (2000).
41 CHARLES TIEFER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PRESIDENCY (1994), supra note 33, at 119-36
(especially Chapter 6, The Persian Gulf War Authorization).
42 Lori Fisler Darnrosch, The Clinton Administration and War Powers, 63 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 131-41 (2000) (providing an overview of the contributions of the
Clinton administration to the war powers debate).
43 Charles Tiefer, War Decisions in the Late I990s by Partial Congressional Declaration,
36 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1,9-16 (1999).
44 Geoffrey S. Corn, Clinton, Kosovo, and the Final Destruction of the War Powers
Resolution, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1149, 1154-55 (2001) (arguing that the Kosovo bombing
campaign revealed a constitutional inadequacy of the War Powers Resolution in relation to such
controversies ).
45 Charles Tiefer, Adjustable Sovereignty: Contemporary Congressional-Executive
Controversies About International Organizations, 35 TEx. INT'L LJ. 239, 255-57 (2000)
(noting that Kosovo and Serbia bombing campaign fits other aspects of congressional-executive
controversies ).
46 See generally Jeffrey A. Meyer, Congressional Control of Foreign Assistance, 13
YALE. J. INT'L L. 69 (1988) (analyzing congressional conditions on aid to Central American
nations facing insurgencies in the 1980s such as EI Salvador; the significance for conditions on
aid to Iraq as it faces its insurgency is discussed in Part IV.B.2, infra 63-69).
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The next Parts turn to the specific arguments about three particular
7
rider types: Part III turns to the single most important Iraq rider type, the
"withdrawal" rider. A "withdrawal" rider would provide funding only if there
is a plan under implementation for withdrawing American ground combat
forces by a set deadline. This involves the ultimate issues of reducing
American war involvement from full to limited. Such a rider fmds its
analogies in the time and scope limits of the Vietnam War,48 and in the
Supreme Court cases upholding congressional power to define wars as
49
limited.
Other arguments about war funding riders receive separate
consideration in Part IV. A bipartisan majority in Congress may also use
riders to change policysO regarding particular aspects of the war. The main
SI
example used here is a rider reducing the combat exposure of reservists to
preserve the reserve and National Guard system with its important
responsibilities in both foreign and (as Hurricane Katrina reminded us)
domestic affairs.s2 Supporters of presidential power may resist such a rider.s3
While no example will perfectly predict the legal and political questions that
may arise, analysis of any war policy example shows how such issues vary
4
s
from those that the Supreme Court has resolved in pase or current confiicts/

47 See Neal Devins, Through the Looking Glass; What Abortion Teaches Us About
American Politics, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 293,325-26 (1994) (discussing abortion riders); Louis
Fisher, The Authorization-Appropriation Process in Congress: Formal Rules and Informal
Practices, 29 CATH. U. L. REv. 51, 67-81 (1979).
48 See, e.g., William Van Alstyne, Congress, the President, and the Power to Declare
War: A Requiemfor Vietnam, 121 U. PA. L. REv. I (1972) (concluding that the President acted
illegally after the repeal of the Tonkin Resolution).
49 Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 169 (1804) (holding that a captain of a vessel follows
instructions from the President at his peril and that if those instructions are not strictly
warranted by law he will be legally liable for the consequences); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. 1,7,
15,31 (1801) (discussing Congress' legislating and how it controls the law of salvage); Bas v.
Tingy,4 U.S. 37 (1800) (discussing Congress' powers to make and limit wars).
so Classic studies of policy riders are Neal E. Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies
Through Limitation Riders, 1987 DUKE L.J. 456 (1987) (arguing that the appropriations process
is not the appropriate place for substantive policymaking); Jacques B. LeBoeuf, Limitations on
the Use of Appropriations Riders by Congress to Effectuate Substantive Policy Changes, 19
HASTINGS CON. L.Q. 457 (1992) (addressing possible separation of powers limits on the use of
riders); Archie Parnell, Congressional Interference in Agency Enforcement: The IRS
Experience, 89 YALE L.J. 1360 (1980) (discussing appropriations limitations affecting the IRS's
ability to enforce the tax code).
SI Andy P. Fernandez, The Need for the Expansion of Military Reservists' Rights in
Furtherance of the Total Force Policy: A Comparison of the USERRA and ADA, 14 ST.
THOMAS L. REv. 859 (2002) (concerning reservist-employee rights); John F. Romano, State
Militias and the United States: Changed Responsibilities for a New Era, 56 A.F. L. REv. 233
(2005) (discussing how the evolving role of state militias and the National Guard has led to a
contradiction with the original intent of the framers). See generally Gen. Accounting Office,
Nat'l Sec. and Int'l Affairs Div., Force Structure: Army Is Integrating Acting and Reserve
Combat Forces, But Challenges Remain, GAOINSIAD 00-162 (2000) (discussing continuing
efforts to integrate active reserves and combat forces).
S2 Gil Grantmore, The Phages of American Law, 36 u.c. DAVIS L. REv. 455, 463-65
(2003); see generally Perpich v. Dep't of Def., 496 U.S. 334 (1990) (affmning congressional
power of the purse).
S3 See, e.g., Theodore B. Olson, Tex Lezar Memorial Lecture, 9 TEx. REv. L. & POL. I
(2004) (arguing that the commander-in-chiefpower is not subject to judicial review).
S4 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 662 (1952) (rejecting Truman's
claim to have power to take control of factories without congressional authorization).
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such as those raised in Hamdi and Rasul. 57 A useful set of criteria may be
applied to assess such provisions, to determine their intrusiveness into
command itself, their generality, and the substantiality of their link to funding.
Congress may add to the aid appropriations conditions to be met by the
Iraq government. The use of riders would reflect differing views between an
American public, which places the highest priority on speeding the troops' exit
from Iraq, and an Iraqi government that represents particular constituencies,
58
particularly the majority Shiites, in Iraq's conflict. The particular example
chosen consists of Congress providing, say, a quarter of appropriated aid
funding only upon certification by our government that Baghdad has made
progress toward an elevated role for the disaffected Sunni minority that is the
insurgency's base. 59
Congress has a history of placing legislative conditions on
appropriated aid, including aid to regimes allied with us against active or
potential insurgencies, such as EI Salvador60 and Guatemala,61 and on aid to
insurgents themselves, such as the Boland Amendments' imposition of terms
62
on direct or indirect aid to the Nicaraguan Contras. 63 Executive supporters
55 Rasul v. Bush, 542 u.s. 466 (2004) (reversing and remanding a case to grant
jurisdiction to "enemy combatants" to file a writ of habeas corpus); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542
U.S. 507 (2004) (concerning the status of an "enemy combatants"); Derek Jinks & David Sloss,
Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 97 (2004)
(concluding that the President does not have authority to violate treaties when Congress has
Article I powers to supersede the treaty); Stephen I. Vladeck, Note, The Detention Power, 22
YALE L. & POL'y REv. 153 (2004) (arguing that an inherent executive power does not exist);
Stephen I. Vladeck, Comment, A Small Problem of Precedent: 18 Us.c. sec. 4001(A) and the
Detention of u.s. Citizen "Enemy Combatants," 112 YALE LJ. 961 (2003) (arguing that
detention of U.S. citizens as "enemy combatants" without charge is illegal).
56 Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (concerning a United States citizen's right to contest his detention
as enemy combatant).
57 Rasul, 542 U.S. 466 (concerning the right of those detained at Guantanamo in
connection with hostilities to contest detention by habeas corpus).
58 For example, before the war, no one could predict confidently that in the first real
election, which took place in January 2005, there would be strong Shiite and Kurdish
participation but much less Sunni participation.
59 To properly bring the debated issues to the forefront, two assumptions are made about
the scale of change in Iraqi policy toward the disaffected Sunni minority. On the one hand, it is
assumed that the American public has lost patience to such an extent as to fuel passage of a
provision demanding very major change in Iraq policy. On the other hand, it is assumed that
the amount of change demanded is more than what is agreeable either to the Iraqi government,
concerned about its Shiite and Kurdish support, or to the President, concerned about using aid
as a weapon against our wartime ally. These assumptions lead to the question of whether
Congress' power to act by way of such a rider can constitutionally overcome the President's
power to decline to implement such a rider.
60 James W. Moeller, Human Rights and United States Security Assistance: El Salvador
and the Case for Country-Specific Legislation, 24 HARv. INT'L L.J. 75 (1983) (discussing the
effectiveness and drawbacks of congressional implementation of human rights funding
restrictions).
61 Tanya Broder & Bernard D. Lambek, Military Aid to Guatemala: The Failure of us.
Human Rights Legislation, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. III (1988) (discussing the failures of
legislation limiting military aid to Guatemala).
62 J. Graham Noyes, Comment, Cutting the President Off From Tin Cup Diplomacy, 24
U.c. DAVIS L. REV. 841 (1991) (arguing against an inherent executive authority to fund foreign
policy initiatives); Alex Whiting, Note, Controlling Tin Cup Diplomacy, 99 YALE L.J. 2043
(1990) (arguing that Congress has the power to limit quid pro quo arrangements as well as
direct funding to executive foreign policy initiatives).
63 See, e.g., Whiting, supra note 62, at 2044-49 (1990) (concerning practice with respect
to aiding the Contras).
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may contend that such a rider interferes with the President's power of
diplomacy,64 which is particularly strong in wartime. 65
Though each of the above-mentioned riders should be deemed
constitutional as it goes through the tortuous enactment process, if such
provisions actually reach enactment, the President would have new options for
asserting his power in opposition to them. Part V 6 applies recent history about
presidential signing statements that purport to brush aside provisions like
these,67 and presidential interpretation and implementation of such provisions
that greatly minimize them. 68 The President adumbrated such a step by his
signing statement on the McCain Amendment regarding detainee treatment. 69
Anticipation of the President's attempts to avoid being bound by riders may
inspire legislators to craft provisions that close loopholes and include standards
and watchdog elements.
This Article's conclusion discusses why congressional efforts to be
involved in war policy, even with all its frustrations and limitations, are,
nevertheless, important to democracy. Congress can both authorize a limited
war and redefine its limits, and can do so through conditions in funding
appropriation.
II.

BACKGROUND TO CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES ON IRAQ WAR
APPROPRIATION PROVISIONS

A.

Original Intent

Textually, and as a matter of original intent, Congress has plenary
power over war appropriations, which presumably includes the power to give
directions on the use of those funds. 70 Article I of the u.s. Constitution spells
out Congress' appropriations power far more powerfully than most of
Congress' other powers. Article I, section 8, clause 12 provides "That the
Congress shall have Power .... To raise and support Armies, but no
Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two
Years." Article I, section 9, clause 7 provides that "No Money shall be drawn
64

United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
Id. at 320 ("[H]e, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions
which prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time ofwar.").
66 Christopher A. Ford, War Powers as We Live Them: Congressional Executive Bargaining
Under the Shadow of the War Powers Resolution, II J.L. & POL. 609 (1995).
65

67 See generally Charles Tiefer, The Constitutionality of Independent Officers as Checks
on Executive Abuse, 63 B.U. L. REV. 59 (1983) (discussing when, in general, a President can
trump a provision in this way); Christine E. Burgess, Note, When Maya President Refuse to
Enforce the Law?, 72 TEX. L. REv. 631 (1994) (same).
68 See David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1,34-35 (1994) (noting that
conditions are part of consent to spending the funding, but analyzing the issue of so-called
"extraneous" conditions).
69 Statement on Signing H.R. 2863, The Department of Defense, Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic
Influenza Act, 2006, 41 WEEKLY CaMP. PRES. DOC. 1917, 1919 (Dec. 30,2005).
70 See Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 424-27 (1990) (fmding
extensive power of Congress over appropriations, in a case concerning spending for former
military personnel).
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from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.,,71 On
the other hand, Article II, section 2, clause I, provides that "The President shall
be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States .... "
And, Article II, section I, clause I, begins with "The executive Power shall be
vested in a President of the United States of America."
In terms of original intent, both the wording of the text and the
documents of the Framers' era invoke strong elements of English and colonial
traditions of vesting the power of the purse in the legislature, particularly as to
the terms of war funding. The historic conflict between the Stuart monarchs
and the House of Commons that led to these clauses specifically concerned the
legislative right to decide the terms and conditions for spending revenue upon
war.72 The English Bill of Rights memorialized the Commons' victory and
prefigured the U.S. Constitution in declaring that "levying money for or to the
use of the Crowne by pretence of prerogative without grant of Parlyament for
longer time or in other manner then the same is or shall be granted is illegal.,,73
And, "[t]he raising or keeping a standing army within the kingdome in time of
peace unlesse it be with consent ofparlyament, is against law.,,74
Meanwhile, the same era laid the foundation for the modest original
intent of the Commander in Chief clause. In 1641, Parliament brought on the
English Civil War by conferring control of the standing army on the Earl of
Essex, who was under parliamentary authority, rather than leaving it with
75
Charles 1. After the Restoration, Parliament maintained its control of the
purse over troop deployments. A 1678 act required that the funds granted be
used to disband the forces stationed in Flanders. 76 Parliament let the King
regain supreme command. In the 1700s, supreme command shifted from the
King to the Cabinet. 77 However, in no way did the return of supreme command
to the King confine or dilute Parliament's established power to control the
limits of war by placing conditions upon the revenues needed for war.
In The Federalist, Alexander Hamilton gave his famous explanation of
the limited authority of the Commander in Chief. Whereas in England the
monarchy had the power to declare war, under the Constitution the Congress
would have that power:
The President is to be Commander-in-chief of the army and
navy of the United States. In this respect his authority would
be nominally the same with that of the King of Great Britain,
71

72

See id. at 424 (discussing section 9, clause 7).
Gerhard Casper, Appropriations of Power, 13 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 1,3-5

(1990).

73 Francis L. Coolidge Jr. & Joel David Sharrow, Note, The War-Making Powers: The
Intentions of the Framers in the Light of Parliamentary History, 50 B.U. L. REv. 5, 8 (1970)
(quoting 1 w. & M. sess. 2, c. w. (1688» (spelling in original). Note the nuances in the phrase
"for longer time or in other manner," which bar the executive from taking a legislative
authorization and stripping off the attached riders. Although the provision speaks about the
legislative revenue-raising action, of course it included spending as well.
74 /d. at 9.
75

76
77

Id.
GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY, supra note 1, at 287.
Coolidge & Sharrow, supra note 73, at 10.
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but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to
nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the
military and naval forces, as fIrst general and admiral of the
Confederacy; while that of the British king extends to the
declaring of war, and to the raising, and regulating of fleets
and armies; all which, by the Constitution under consideration,
78
would appertain to the Legislature.
The Framers seem to have intended the commander-in-chief clause to avoid
the excesses of the Continental Congress, which, during the Revolutionary
War, had meddled in such "supreme command and direction of the military
and naval forces.,,79 When even the executive-minded Hamilton assured that
Congress' powers would include "the raising and regulating of fleets and
armies," nothing could have been further from the Framers' minds than to
undo the purse-string control achieved by Parliament over the Stuart monarchs
more than a century earlier. So the relatively limited meaning of the
commander-in-chief clause, as the Supreme Court has commented, is this: "As
commander-in-chief, he is authorized to direct the movements of the naval and
military forces placed by law at his command, and to employ them in the
manner he may deem most effectual to harass and conquer and subdue the
enemy.,,80
It was difficult enough for the Framers to persuade the states in the late
1780s to place the powers to raise and spend revenue on the national
government's military beyond the states' own control. 8! Instead, the Framers
put their trust in Congress' use of the power of the purse to limit war and bring
82
about policy changes and peace.

78

THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 6 (Alexander Hamilton).
Id. See generally RICHARD B. MORRIS, THE FORGING OF THE UNION, 1781-1789
(1987); JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION (1996); JACK N. RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLITICS: AN
INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS (1979) (all discussing the forming of
the Constitution).
80 Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. 603, 615 (1850).
81 In other contexts, executive supporters have argued that the Constitutional Convention
reacted against the unrestrained state legislatures of the 1780s and took steps intended to curb
Congress' powers. However, in this context, there seems to be little or no sign that the
Convention had a mind to vest power in the President to supersede terms limiting war spending.
On the contrary, the specific language about spending no money from the Treasury,
except in consequence of appropriations made by law, came as a series of states put similar
clauses in their own constitutions. The states did so because "at the same time states enhanced
executive authority, they reinforced their legislatures' hold on the state fisc, principally by
proscribing the expenditure of funds except as directed by legislative enactment." Richard D.
Rosen, Funding "Non-Traditional" Military Operations: The Alluring Myth of a Presidential
Power of the Purse, 155 MIL. L. REv. 1,63 (1998).
To vest the wartime revenue-raising and appropriating in the national governmentwithout congressional representatives responsible to the people and the states deciding upon the
conditions to attach to that funding, and instead to place unchecked power in the hands of a
President remote from the states and somewhat suspected of monarchical potential-could
never have been their intent. For a discussion of the period from the American Revolution to
the Constitution, see Casper, supra note 72, at 6-8.
82 Rosen, supra note 81, at 72-74.
79
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Practice before World War II

The more promising arguments by executive supporters look to the
history of actions by strong Presidents, particularly President Lincoln, and
those in office during the Cold War, notably Presidents Truman, Johnson, and
Nixon. 83 However, the actual history does not support the notion that the
executive's "commander-in-chief' power trumps congressional power of the
purse. Under President Washington, the government found a balance between
foreign relations and spending powers. To simplify, the President had his
84
power, but the Congress, in its spending authority, had its own final power.
In that period, and thereafter, the House generally went along with funding
what the President wanted in foreign affairs and war, just as Congress has
continued to usually fund war and foreign policy without restrictive terms or
85
conditions.
Wars came about, usually by freely made congressional decision, as
with the War of 1812, the Spanish-American War, and World War 1;86
sometimes by foreign attack, as with World War II; and sometimes by
executive decisions about committing troops to a locus of potential or actual
conflict in which battle actually ensued, as with the Mexican War and the
Korean War. However hostilities started, Congress had the power to use riders
on military appropriations to decide policy. As with appropriations for treaty
implementation, Congress typically used military appropriation riders in ways
that both supported war efforts and kept faith with the rest of national security
policymaking.
Before the Vietnam War, there was a history of Congress using, or
threatening to use, its power to put terms on military wartime appropriations
when suspicious about the President. Uncovering that history, however, takes
some digging. 87 In the most historically famous example, during the Mexican
War, the House twice passed a condition on an appropriation, known as the
83 Wiliam B. Spong, Jr., Book Note, War Powers of the President and Congress: Who
Holds the Arrows and Olive Branch?, 68 VA. L. REv. 1437, 1438 (1982) (reviewing book of
the same title by W. Taylor Reveley (1981».
84 As to the Jay Treaty, the President (and the Senate) made an enormously important
treaty with Great Britain, excluding the House from the ratification process, even though
ratification of the treaty entailed the enactment of appropriations, requiring House approval, for
implementation. At the time, in partisan terms, the Senate and Presidency were in the process
of becoming bastions of the Federalist Party, and the House of the other party (later called
"Democratic-Republican" and then "Democratic") led by Jefferson and Madison. That balance
left it to the House to decide whether to go along with the Senate and the President to enact
those appropriations, without any mechanism that could bind, compel, or bypass it to approve
such appropriations. See Nobleman, infra note 93, at 148--49 (Jay Treaty). For the early history
of appropriations, see Casper, supra note 72, at 9-21.
85 Rosen makes a useful comparison, as he researched the history, between congressional
power in the 1790s and congressional power two centuries later: "The position taken by the
House of Representatives in April 1796 [about not being obliged to fund the Jay Treaty] has
prevailed. This is exemplified today by Congress' continuing refusal to appropriate the money
needed to satisfy dues assessed against the United States under the United Nations Charter,
although the United States is bound by treaty to pay the dues." Rosen, supra note 81, at 128
(footnotes omitted).
86 Some would say that the commencement by Germany of unrestricted submarine warfare
amounted to the same kind of foreign attack as Pearl Harbor, and similarly forced Congress'
hand.
87 See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note I, at 380 n.29.
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"Wilmot Proviso," to bar slavery in territory to be acquired from Mexico. 88
Although the final appropriation law omitted the proviso, the House's passage
of that proviso signaled that the free states would block slavery in the
territories while slave states were losing control of Congress. Historians view
the proviso, and other House pronouncements about the Mexican War,89 as key
developments that spurred the slave states' doubt about their future in
Congress and ultimately led, just over a dozen years later, to their choice of
•
90
secessIOn.
The use of riders accelerated during the Civil War.91 Then, by the use
of such riders on military appropriations, congressional influence
predominated in Reconstruction; occupation armies implementing
Reconstruction policies in the Southern states got their directions from such
92
riders. Congressional influence continued to predominate effectively until the
. h century. 93
earIy twentIet
During President Theodore Roosevelt's administration, Congress and
the President wrestled for control of the expanded navy. In one notable
instance, Congress conditioned appropriations on a minimum of eight percent
of detachments aboard naval vessels being marines. Roosevelt's Attorney
General conceded the condition's constitutionality, opining that "[C]ongress is
the sole judge of how the Army or Navy shall be raised and of what it shall be
composed," and that Congress could condition "that such appropriation [for the
marines] shall not be available unless the marine corps be employed in some
designated way.,,94 Roosevelt found ways to stake out his claims to power
without denying constitutional allocations of authority to Congress. In a
famous incident, when Congress appropriated less funding than Roosevelt
needed to send his "Great White Fleet" around the world, he declared he would
88 Kristian D. Whitten, The Fourteenth Amendment: Justice Bradley's Twentieth Century
Legacy, 29 CUMBo L. REv. 143, 148 (1999).
89 See HENKIN, supra note 1, at 381 n.33.
90 See G. Randal Hornaday, Note, The Forgotten Empire: Pre-Civil War Southern
Imperialism, 36 CONN. L. REv. 225,253 (2003).
91 "The great volume of legislation required by the rebellion made this period prolific in
riders." Alexander Johnston, RIDERS (in u.s. History), in ill CYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL
SCIENCE, POLITICAL ECONOMY, AND OF THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES By
THE BEST AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN AUTHORS, 147.7 (John 1. Lalor ed., 1899), available at
http://oll.libertyfund.org/ToC/0216-03.php (a great source on this subject, virtually unavailable
until the Internet).
92 See id. Johnston describes the whole period, rider by rider. The tone was set during the
military occupation of the South immediately after the Civil War. It took the form of a fullscale clash between Congress and the President, with the Republican Congress setting policy
through riders. President Andrew Johnson was impeached for breaching a key one of those
riders; he escaped conviction in the Senate by a single vote. Johnston recites a fascinating
account of how, from 1876 on, the fierce struggle over various riders for the army appropriation
bills marked the end of Reconstruction. Briefer allusions to this occur in Henkin, supra note 1,
at 380 n.29; Michael J. Gerhardt, Ackermania: The Quest for a Common Law of Higher
Lawmaking, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1731, 1763 (1999).
93 Until Theodore Roosevelt, Congress, also using the Senate's so-called "treaty veto" as
well as congressional control of appropriations, set the bounds in military and overseas affairs.
See generally Eli E. Nobleman, Financial Aspects of Congressional Participation in Foreign
Relations, 289 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 145 (1951) (describing the Senate's
"treaty veto" and appropriations as dual means for congressional participation in foreign
relations).
94 27 Op. Att'y Gen. 259, 260 (1909).
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send it halfway,9S obliging Congress to appropriate additional funds to bring it
96
back.
97
Perhaps the most momentous war-related condition of the twentieth
century prior to the Cold War occurred in 1940. At a time when the public
largely wished to avoid involvement in the European war, President Franklin
Roosevelt had staked his ability to act on a distinction between steps he would
take for preparedness and steps that would be taken for military intervention
overseas, which he pledged to avoid. Roosevelt succeeded in getting the
nation's first peacetime draft through Congress by the bare margin of a single
vote in the House, only by accepting a famous condition that no draftees be
stationed outside of the Western Hemisphere or the territories and possession
of the United States. 98 Roosevelt may not have completely abided by the
condition, but his general acceptance of it expressed deference to Congress in
its setting of limits on the use of the military. 99
C.

Practice since World War II

After World War II, during the Cold War, Presidents Truman,
Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson, to varying extents, demonstrated that they
would make their own unilateral decisions on commitments abroad and on use
of force. The Korean War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the commitments
that evolved into the Vietnam War, were primarily presidential rather than
congressional decisions. Congress did not effectively curb presidential war
initiation by resort to any of its powers, including appropriations conditions,
until the 1970s.
Nonetheless, that did not mean the complete atrophy of congressional
influence over foreign affairs via the appropriations power during the period
from World War II to the Vietnam War. Rather, starting with the Marshall
Plan and the Truman Doctrine, the United States made its great tool in winning
and sustaining allies through the provision of foreign aid, both military and
non-military. Establishing the foreign aid programs and deciding on their
funding became a major congressional task and eventually a fertile field for
congressional legislating and conditioning-something of a forerunner to the
reconstruction aid for Iraq.
9S

Henry B. Gonzalez, The Relinquishment of Co-Equality by Congress, 29 HARV. 1.

ON

LEGIS. 33 I, 336 (I 992).
96

Note, Congress, the President, and the Power to Commit Forces to Combat, 81 HARv.

L. REv. 1771, 1801 (1968).

97 This particular condition was not an appropriation rider, but rather was placed on the
authorization legislation for the draft. Technically, it could be dismissed for that reason as
irrelevant to an analysis of appropriation riders. History, however, singled out this momentous
legislation to serve as the vehicle for a condition restraining the President from making a
controversial use of his draftees.
98 Selective Training and Service Act, ch. 720, § 3(e), 54 Stat. 885, 886 (1940).
99 Charles 1. Cooper, Comment, Symposium: A Constitutional Bicentennial Celebration of
the Imperial Presidency, 47 MD. L. REv. 84, 97 n.44 (1987). Former Assistant Attorney
General Cooper, in a historically learned essay, notes that Roosevelt sent troops to Greenland
and Iceland despite the latter being outside the Western Hemisphere. Id. This was indeed a
violation of the letter of the condition, but was not seen at the time as a serious violation of its
spirit, as the Iceland occupation kept near the balance of defensive preparations rather than
interventionist action.
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The later part of the Vietnam War marked a historic turning point, with
Congress seeking to regain control of war action via appropriations riders.
This Article will discuss below the specifics of the Vietnam War's
appropriation scope limits and fund cutoffs. Speaking broadly, a congressional
backlash started in the early 1970s against what the nation saw as the "imperial
presidency" of the Cold War. 'OO Sharp policy disputes were often resolved by
votes on appropriation riders. For example, the next area for potential covert
armed intervention abroad after the fall of Vietnam turned out to be Angola.
Congress, however, enacted the Clark Amendment-a condition on
appropriations-to preclude such intervention in Angola.101
Particularly in the late 1970s, the procedurally-minded observer could
see that Congress enacted appropriations riders partly because members of
Congress' minority party could thereby raise issues despite opposition by the
majority party's agenda-controlling leadership.l02 For example, Senator Jesse
Helms (R-N.C.), and kindred conservative House Republicans could raise
foreign policy issues by appropriation riders in the late 1970s, notwithstanding
the opposition of the Democratic President (Carter) and Democratic Senate,
House, and committee leaderships.'O)
President Reagan's controversial military initiatives-his overt aid for
EI Salvador against its insurgency, and his covert aid for the Contra rebels
against Nicaragua -naturally elicited resort to Congress' power of the purse.
This Article will discuss below the specifics of the Contra-related Boland
Amendments.
Again, the resort to riders also reflected procedural
considerations. When the divided Congress was unable to enact other forms of
legislation about subjects like the Contras, appropriation riders could get
through. The riders succeeded partly because the President affirmatively
needed the House's votes for appropriations for aid, such as aid to EI Salvador
and "humanitarian" aid to the Contras. Another reason for the riders' success
was that necessary appropriations for other purposes, such as continuing
resolutions, had to go through, even when they contained a rider disliked by
the White House. '04
100 See generally ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (4th ed. 1974)
(analyzing the growth in powers of the presidency, particularly as to war and foreign affairs,
and its acceleration during the Cold War).
101 Clark Amendment, Pub. L. No. 94-329, § 404,90 Stat. 729, 757-58 (1976), amended
by International Security and Development Cooperation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-533, tit. I, §
118(a)-(d), 94 Stat. 3141 (1980). For a detailed account of the provision's passage, particularly
its roots in the Ford Administration's diminished credibility about such interventions, see
Franck & Weisband, infra note 130, at 51-55.
102 Congressional committees will not report free-standing bills on this subject to the floor,
and even hypothesizing a proposed provision could reach a conference committee, there it
would die. In contrast to the House, in the Senate proponents of a proposition advancing
criteria for troop withdrawal may offer it as a non-germane amendment on a bill that the House
has, or will, adopt, so that the Senate proposition makes it to conference. However, the floor
leadership in both chambers may choose the conference delegations so that the proposition gets
watered down or dropped before a conference report comes back to the two chambers.
10) See, e.g., CHARLES WHALEN, THE HOUSE AND FOREIGN POLICY: THE IRONY OF
CONGRESSIONAL REFORM 92-95 (1981).
104 In 1981-86, the majority party in the Senate was the President's party.
Thus the
President and his Senate leadership, could block most avenues for legislating, such as
independent ("free-standing") bills to put Boland-like restrictions into permanent law. But, the
President and the Senate leadership could not block appropriation riders, at least not completely.
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Although there were no momentous war appropriation conditions
during the term of President George H. W. Bush, there was an important
development of significance in how Presidents could respond to
appropriations. President Bush continued and expanded President Reagan's
formalized use of a hitherto insignificant gesture, the "signing statement."
President Bush used signing statements extensively for expressing
disagreement with, among other types of provisions, defense spending terms,
which he said "might be construed to impinge on the President's authority as
Commander in Chief and as the head of the executive branch.,,105 His signing
statements announced that he would treat these provisions as diluted in some
way-for example, as merely expressing a congressional aspiration-when
Congress had actually worded the provision in strong mandatory language.
The use of a signing statement as a potential response to an Iraq war term will
be discussed later.
During the Clinton presidency, congressional struggle with the
President over obedience to appropriation controls was in relative remission.
In response to the ill-fated course of the American intervention in Somalia,
6
Congress put in place the ByrdlO and Kempthome l07 Amendments, which
required American troops to leave that country by a 1994 deadline and not to
return unless Congress specifically granted approval. The new Republican
congressional majority after 1994 conducted disputes with President Clinton
by proposals such as appropriation conditions forbidding American forces
from taking part in multilateral peacekeeping under United Nations command.
Although the Clinton Justice Department issued a lengthy opinion of much
interest purporting to reject such a condition as unconstitutional,108 in reality
President Clinton went to great lengths to demonstrate clearly that he would
put American troops deployed to Bosnia under an American general and a
109
NATO structure, not under the objected-to U.N. command.
As for the very real presidential military actions,"° President Clinton
committed troops to Bosnia in 1995 and led NATO's bombing campaign
against Milosevic' s Serbia in the Kosovo conflict in 1999. In both instances
Congress, after significant debate, neither expressly authorized nor expressly
disapproved, by legislation or by appropriation conditions, these military
105 Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, 2
PUB. PAPERS 1766-67 (Nov. 5, 1990).
106 See Ford, supra note 66, at 686-88.
107 Rosen, supra note 81, at II n.53.
108 Placing of United States Armed Forces Under United Nations Operational or Tactical
Control, 20 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 182 (1996).
109 The word "NATO" appeared ten times in President Clinton's address about the
commitment (not counting the additional multiple mentions of European allies), while "United
Nations" appeared only once. The only mention of the U.N. was that "American troops will
take their orders from the American general who commands NATO .... [U]nlike the U.N.
forces, they will have the authority to respond immediately .... " President William J. Clinton,
If We're Not There, NATO Will Not Be ... Peace Will Collapse, WASH. POST., Nov. 28, 1995,
at A8 (text of President's address). President Clinton twice noted the command structure for
American forces: that they were under the command of an American general and would take
their orders from the American general. Id.
110 As to Haiti, see Marian Nash, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
Internat'l Law, 89 AM. 1. INT'L L. 96, 101-02 (1995); Mark T. Uyeda, Note, Presidential
Prerogative Under the Constitution to Deploy u.s. Military Forces in Low-Intensity Conflict,
44 DUKE L. 1. 777, 824-27 (1995).
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actions and commitments in the former Yugoslavia. III In a tense and delicate
way, in the 1990s neither the President nor Congress gave up ground; rather,
there was something of an armed truce in the war powers dispute.
President George W. Bush, in his first term, sought and received two
express congressional authorizations for the use of force. One came three days
after the 9/11 terrorist attack. Notwithstanding the expansive claims made for
that September 14 resolution,112 its drafting clearly reflects a compromise over
his loose initial proposal with the leadership of the then majority Democratic
ll3
Senate.
The more cautiously drafted compromise version adopted by
Congress no longer authorized hostilities with countries having no share in
9111; that is, it specifically avoided authorizing hostilities with the particular
country known to be out of favor with some of the President's advisersIraq. I14 The other authorization concerned Iraq,IIS and came on the eve of the
2002 midterm election. It conditioned force against Iraq upon fresh steps in
the international arena,116 and President Bush used it to invade Iraq the
following spring without a fresh resolution, or majority support for one, from
the Security Council. 117 Of course, President Bush took many steps to mobilize
his war powers. 118 Still, in war powers terms, those two express congressional
resolutions of 2001 and 2002 meant that President Bush had, relative to other
Presidents like Nixon, respected the separation of powers in terms of obtaining
congressional authorization for war.
III.

RillERFOR WITHDRAWAL FROM A FULLY AUTHORIZED WAR?

A.

Basic Argument

The most important appropriation rider type would direct a process or
sequence of withdrawing American ground units from combat in Iraq. This
would involve more than mere policymaking, but raises the ultimate question
of ramping down war involvement itself. Just as the initial authorization for
use of force makes the commitment of armed forces to war, a congressional
direction for phased withdrawal implicates the reduction of military
commitment. This is the case even assuming the rider allows such limited
III For this period, see Charles Tiefer, War Decisions in the Late i990s by Partial
Congressional Declaration, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REv. I, 9-16 (1999); and Charles Tiefer,
Adjustable Sovereignty: Contemporary CongreSSional-Executive Controversies About
international Organizations, 35 TEX. INT'L L.J. 239, 255-57 (2000).
112 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 24, at 2054-55 (discussing resolution passed by
Congress on September 14,2001 and signed by President Bush on September 18, 2001).
113 See generally Abramowitz, supra note 23 (outlining the legal and political issues raised
in the passing of this resolution and the manner in which members of Congress reached a
compromise on the resolution's text).
114 For the loose original While House proposal printed in the Congressional Record by
Senator Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.), see 147 CONGo REc. S9950-S9952 (daily ed. Oct. 1,2001).
lIS See Ramsey, supra note 39, at 332-34.
116 For analysis of the ignored language in the Iraq resolution, see JOHN W. DEAN, WORSE
THAN WATERGATE (2004).
117 The international sequence is treated in Sean D. Murphy, Assessing the Legality of
Invading iraq, 92 GEO. L.J. 173, 177 (2004).
118 Nancy Kassop, The War Power and its Limits, 33 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 509 (2003)
(describing the sequence and basis on which President Bush invaded Iraq).
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forms of continued commitment as some remaining ground commitment,
American advisers, special forces units, air and naval forces, intelligence and
logistics to continue to support Baghdad against any ongoing insurgency in
Iraq. The change from a substantial American commitment, in terms of large
numbers of American ground forces with large American casualties, to a
reduced involvement with fewer American casualties, downshifts American
involvement in the war.
A rider that House Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi drafted in June
2005 for the FY 2006 defense appropriations fell into this category. The Pelosi
Amendment would have required the President to set forth criteria for when it
would be "appropriate to begin the withdrawal of United States Armed Forces
from Iraq. ,,119 The criteria it sought included "assessing the capabilities and
readiness of Iraqi security forces," and "the milestones and timetable for
achieving,,120 the goals for such forces, an estimate of the total number of Iraqi
personnel needed to perform the duties of current U.S. forces, the level of U.S.
advisors needed to support Iraqi forces, and the political milestones for Iraq.121
The Pelosi Amendment sponsors could not phrase the amendment
122
A limitation
within the narrow strictures for a "limitation" amendment.
amendment to an appropriation bill is in order-without needing any waiver of
the House and Senate floor rules against adding legislative amendments to an
appropriation-because it complies with a number of strictures, such as not
involving any exercise of discretion by an executive official. It is all but
impossible to write limitation riders that carry out delicate and complex
policies while satisfying the requirements for a limitation amendment. Quite
possibly, the best versions of each of the types of war and aid funding riders
could not be written as limitation riders.
However, even though war and aid funding riders may not meet the
strict tests for limitation amendments, they may qualify to be made readily in
order for offering on an appropriation bill. They may well apply to the specific
funds (typically single-year funds) in the bill, and otherwise satisfy the
For example, consider an
requirements to be considered "germane."
amendment to an appropriation bill funding the war stating that "none of the
funds in this law may be used for military activity in Iraq unless the President
is implementing a plan to reduce American ground forces in Iraq to a level
below 80,000 by 18 months after this law's date of enactment." Such an
amendment would not satisfy the full requirements for a limitation amendment
because of the degree of discretion it gives the President, but would be
considered germane to the bill. In the House such amendments procedurally
require a waiver provision on the special rule to be in order for consideration.
That special rule is a resolution reported by the House Rules Committee that
119

Pelosi Amendment, sec. (a), 151 CONGo REc. H4S80 (daily ed. June 16, 2005).
Id. sec. (b)(I).
121 Id. sees. (b)(2)-(4).
122 For example, the most famous rider in recent decades is the Hyde Amendment, which
prohibits spending Medicaid funds on abortions. It could not be written to include an exception
for the health and life of the mother because such an exception would preclude it from being a
limitation amendment. Tiefer, supra note 9, at 986. Instead, it is typically adopted on the
House floor with no such exception, but with a promise by its sponsors (which is kept) that such
an exception will be added in conference. Id. at 987.
120
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sets the procedure for consideration of the bill. An amendment that is
technically legislation on an appropriation, and hence subject to a point of
order, becomes in order by dint of the provision in the special rule waiving the
point of order.
That was true of the Pelosi Amendment. 123 When the majority
leadership of the House refused to provide such a waiver, supporters of the
Pelosi Amendment attempted the procedural steps to obtain the waiver and to
make the amendment in order. 124 They were narrowly defeated in a vote; some
majority members joined with the minority party, almost succeeding in putting
together the requisite strength to move the amendment. 125 The existence of this
channel for putting a war funding rider before the House constitutes a major
respect in which the democratic process encompasses decisionmaking in the
course of an ongoing war. If the public wants to know how it can assert its
democratic prerogatives during an unpopular war, the answer includes pressing
representatives in Congress to make a war funding rider in order and, then, to
approve it.
A brief debate occurred regarding the Pelosi Amendment, but the
discussion was too truncated for significant airing of either policy or
constitutional questions. Still, the offering of the amendment echoed the early
It
stages of the proposed amendments during the Vietnam War. 126
demonstrated the existence of a large body of members willing to stake out the
position favoring, albeit without a definite deadline, a phased process of
withdrawal of the troops. There is every reason to expect that future shifts in
public opinion about the Iraq war would bring sufficient bipartisan strength to
make a rider in order and to pass it. Down the road, if the gap increased
between public disenchantment with the war and presidential unwillingness to
conduct a process of withdrawal, a stronger amendment could mandate, and
succeed as the means for enacting, a drawdown schedule with definite
deadlines.
Besides the policy issues a withdrawal rider might trigger, either in
Congress, in the press, or elsewhere, such a rider also raises debated
constitutional issues. Supporters of congressional authority would cite the
English and colonial origins, the expressed Framers' intent, and the long
history of Congress' plenary power of the purse with regard to military
spending. In functional and structural terms, they could point out that the
public in an American-style democracy must have a way to limit their funding
of a war with unacceptable costs and losses. For those who say that a
congressional power to impose such terms would deny support to the troops,
the answer has always been that full funding support for the troops would
123 lSI CONGo REC. H4569, H4570 (daily ed. June 16, 2005) (statement of Democratic
Leader Pelosi).
124 Id. This requires defeating the motion for the previous question on the version of the
special rule reported by the Rules Committee. If the previous question is defeated, supporters
of the Pelosi Amendment could amend the special rule to add a waiver of the rule against
legislation on an appropriation, and then adopt the rule as amended. The Pelosi Amendment
would then be in order.
125 Id.
126 Long before the successful amendments were enacted, the McGovern-Hatfield
Amendment was proposed and defeated. JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY:
CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 29 (1993).
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continue until their withdrawal. Troops do not want to fight a war where their
nation no longer feels they should be sacrificed. The best way to support
troops may be to withdraw them from combat when they have done what they
can.
The precedents of greatest relevance consist of the scope limits and
cutoff provisions during the latter part of the Vietnam War. By 1971,
Congress had repealed the original congressional authorization for the war, the
127
1964 Tonkin Gulf Resolution and began to pass provisions recommending
withdrawal of American troops. Nevertheless, President Nixon widened the
war by using American forces in ground incursions and bombing of Cambodia
and Laos. Notwithstanding the memorable early justification for this by then
28
Assistant Attorney General William H. Rehnquist/ such expansion of the war
triggered strong congressional reactions.
This included appropriation
conditions in 1971-73, and later, an appropriation cutoff for combat support
after August 15, 1973, with a series of famous proposed and enacted
amendments known by the names of their sponsors:
Cooper-Church,
Mansfield, Fulbright, and Eagleton. 129 When President Nixon avoided the
cutoffs by transferring appropriation funds, he aroused the proponents of floor
amendments. During the enactment of subsequent appropriation bills, these
proponents essentially defeated the efforts of the Armed Services Committee
and House floor leadership to forestall them and succeeded in imposing strict
and comprehensive appropriation cutoffs.
These ultimately precluded
President Ford from recommitting American forces to prop up South Vietnam
against its final collapse. 130
These various Vietnam War provisions evoked much war powers
debate, at the time and subsequently. President Nixon gave different rationales
at different times for controversial combat action, particularly the bombing of
Cambodia, which might have been undertaken for offensive strategic reasons
of achieving victories in that country, or for defensive reasons of forestalling
attacks from sanctuaries there on American forces in South Vietnam. As a
result, part of the debate over the legislated prohibitions, such as limits on
operations outside Vietnam, concerned the diverse impacts of those limits on
variously-rationalized combat operations.13I It remained particularly open to
debate whether Congress would cut off the use of defense appropriations for
such bombing when the President expressed their purpose as being to protect
our withdrawing ground troops.132 More importantly, though, the course of
action demonstrated that Congress could condition appropriations to preclude
the continuation of American large-scale combat intervention. However, this
demonstration of congressional power regarded the Vietnam War, where there
127
128

See Van Alstyne, supra note 48, at 20-21.

William H. Rehnquist, The Constitutional Issues-Administration Position, 45 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 628 (1970) (printing then-Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist's justification of
President Nixon's military operations in neutral Cambodia and Laos, on grounds such as the
President's legal authority to protect the troops even from the enemy units in neutral countries).
129 See WORMUTH & FIRMAGE, supra note 12, at 105.
130 THOMAS M. FRANCK & EDWARD WEISBAND, FOREIGN POLICY BY CONGRESS 13-33
(1979).
131 ELY, supra note 126, at 34-46.
132 See BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 1, at 156.
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were doubts about whether the broad conflict, as it had evolved, had ever really
been fully authorized. Accordingly, the Vietnam War precedents raise the
question of whether riders could limit a fully authorized and funded war, the
question next addressed.
B.

Riders Limiting a Fully Authorized and Funded War
l.

Applying the Vietnam War Precedents

On the frequently arising question of the President's authority to
commit armed forces to hostilities without specific congressional
authorization, presidential supporters have had many occasions to express their
views. III In contrast, the record is less developed on the issue of presidential
power to continue a war in the face of limiting provisions on appropriations
once hostilities are long underway, apart from the debate over the Vietnam
War provisions. The Vietnam War riders are the single overridingly strong
example of congressional funding limitations on an ongoing war. Those riders
plainly validated that Congress could impose limiting terms to bring American
involvement in a war to an end, regardless of whether the President agreed.
Still, reliance by proponents of Iraq war riders solely upon the
Vietnam War as precedent would likely evoke a strong reaction from
presidential power enthusiasts. Such enthusiasts know that they must address
the comparison between the Iraq War and the Vietnam War and will probably
continue to feel comfortable making their stand in terms of politically
persuasive distinctions between the wars. They describe the Iraq War as a
commitment on behalf of a democracy to replace the toppled regime of
Saddam Hussein, against an insurgency having the tactics and loud backing of
the terrorists of 9/1l. This contrasts with the Vietnam War, in which there was
relatively little emphasis on South Vietnam becoming a democracy, and in
which the insurgency, albeit Communist, was not linked to terrorists who had
inflicted thousands of casualties within the United States. If there is support
for the United States in the Iraqi population, and there is no clear alternative
for Iraq short of anarchy, victory seems obtainable in the Iraq War; the
Vietnam War had no such obtainable end (especially in hindsight).
Many items go into the mix of comparing a 1960s anti-Communist war
with 50,000 American deaths with the present war against a Middle Eastern
insurgency with a few thousand American deaths. Some observers would
focus on the similarities, others would focus on the differences. As to the
constitutional issue, it is important that analysis of the validity of the Iraq
riders not be reduced to whether Iraq is "like" Vietnam. The Vietnam War did
not establish some kind of narrow legal exception that gives Congress its
constitutional power of the purse only in a conflict with high enough casualties
and low enough probability of victory. Rather, the Vietnam War riders
illustrate that Congress has the constitutional power of the purse to reduce the
scope of a war commitment. The interesting argument concerns whether there
III See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 17 (responding to Professor Michael Ramsey's pro-Congress
view of the war powers debate, based on a textual and structural theory ofa flexible approach to
war powers); Sidak, supra note 14 (arguing that the Appropriations Clause has at times been
improperly invoked by Congress in order to limit the funds available to the President).
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was some legal reason that appropriation riders in the Iraq War would not be a
valid use of that power.
The best legal ground for presidential supporters to make a case
distinguishing Iraq war funding riders from Vietnam riders rests upon a legal
difference between the wars, namely, the full authorization the President
obtained to initiate the commitment to the Iraq war, or alternatively, something
unique about the post-9111 world. 134 The President in the fully authorized and
funded Iraq war arguably has more legal authority than did President Nixon in
the legally unauthorized wars in Cambodia and Laos in the 1970s, which
followed an initial Vietnam commitment pursuant to the flawed Tonkin Gulf
Resolution. For that matter, President Truman committed American troops to
the Korean War without asking for express congressional ratification and then
seized domestic steel mills to promote the war effort without congressional
authorization. Thus, he had less legal backing in war powers law than
President Bush has for the Iraq conflict. 135 Congress had not voted expressly
for either President Truman's Korean War actions or for President Nixon's
military operations in Cambodia and Laos. In contrast, Congress voted
expressly on the 2002 authorization of force in Iraq. Even if Congress
subsequently decides to put riders on its Iraq funding bills, it had provided full
funding of the war prior to those riders and was continuing to provide funding
while passing those riders.
The argument that appropriation riders have less power to scale back a
declared or otherwise explicitly authorized war like Iraq improves when
employed as part of two strategies discussed below: (1) emphasis on the
congressionally authorized mission in Iraq; and (2) interpreting riders in order
to brush aside and minimize them. To support these strategies, the President
needs to advance significant legal and constitutional arguments, rather than
relying on the practical differences between Iraq and Vietnam. The President
relies on the congressional authorization concerning Iraq, formally granted in
2002 and not repealed or amended, as part of his source of authority. This
authorization provides a constitutional distinction from the Vietnam War. The
President also argues that the post-9fll world is legally different with respect
to the President's powers. \36
Critics of the Iraq war may question the clarity of the 2002
authorization as applied years later, recalling the difference between the
anticipated short-term hostilities with Saddam Hussein's regime and the

134 For example, to justity warrantless eavesdropping of communications with the United States,
the Justice Department devoted section II of its memorandum to the congressional enactment of the
September 14,2001 full authorization of war against Al Qaeda and its allies. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
DESCRIBED
BY
THE
PRESIDENT
(Jan.
19,
2006),
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/whitepaperonnsa\egalauthorities.pdf.at10.

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,676-80 (1952).
Proponents of strong presidential powers took an opportunity soon after 9/11 to argue
that the President's powers to deal with the situation were broad. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, THE PRESIDENT'S CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT
MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAlNST TERRORISTS AND THE NATIONS SUPPORTING THEM,
http://www.usdoj.gov!o!c/warpowers925.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2006).
\35

\36

312

STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

42:291

unanticipated, drawn-out counter-insurgency that has ensued.137 This line of
criticism, disputing the initial basis for war authorization, mayor may not
matter politically, but it is separate from the question l38 of the current legal
validity of the authorization. 139
2.

The Unconstitutional Conditions Argument

Far more important than questioning the initial authorization of the
Iraq war in 2002 is, taking that authorization and subsequent full funding as a
given, analyzing how that affects terms placed as riders in the funding to ramp
down the war. The strong challenge by presidential power proponents to
withdrawal terms is that they invalidly attempt to make the Commander in
Chief do something contrary to his constitutional authority in a fully funded,
fully authorized war. Presidential proponents argue that Congress is trying to
take back a power constitutionally vested in the President by virtue of the
initial authorization and the continued funding. Such withdrawal terms, they
argue, are unconstitutional conditions .140
Executive supporters on the Iran-Contra committee used the
"unconstitutional conditions" argument about the Boland Amendments 141 and
cited case law to extend the doctrine to the executive branch. 142 The Clinton
Administration relied on the "unconstitutional conditions" phrase when it
opined that the President could reject a condition on national security funding
and yet still spend the funds,143 an approach that would be summarized, in the
blunt language of politics, as "say no, but keep the dough. ,,144 In a relatively
recent signing statement, President Bush used a similar rationale regarding a
provIsion apparently responding to an earlier Iraq-related use of
137 Other challenges include: (\) The justifications expressed by the Administration about
the asserted existence of stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction; and (2) the
Administration's decision to proceed, despite non-fulfillment of the 2002 congressional
authorization's pre-condition of another attempt to gain international support via the Security
Council. The case as to conditions in the 2002 authorization is made in JOHN W. DEAN,
WORSE THAN WATERGATE (2004).
138 See generally Ely, supra note 32 (rigorously distinguishing between the war within
Vietnam itself, which received authorization, however improperly obtained, in the Tonkin Gulf
Resolution, and the wars in Cambodia and Laos, which lacked such formal authorization).
139 The Vietnam War is nearly unmatched in its degree of subterfuge and veiling of the
extent and duration of ground troop commitment. It was effectively commenced when
President Lyndon Johnson obtained congressional authorization via the Tonkin Gulf Resolution.
Even the methods by which President Tyler initiated the Mexican-American War of 1846-48,
or the questionable basis of the start of the Spanish-American War of \898, show that the
standard of the past has been low in this regard.
140 See supra note 28, at 145--46.
141 H.R. REp. NO. 100--433 100th CONG., S. REp. No. 100-216 100th CONG., at 476-77
(1987).
142 They invoked case law in the domestic context that has indicated that an appropriation
condition precluding the Department of Justice from performing constitutional functions, such
as with respect to busing remedies in school integration cases, would be an unconstitutional
condition. Id. at 479 n.23 (citing Brown v. Califano, 627 F.2d 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
143 The Sufficiency of the President's Certification Under the Mexican Debt Disclosure
Act, 20 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 673 (\996); Powell, supra note 27, at 551-54 & n.122.
144 "Say no, but keep the dough" is a blunt way of saying that the essence of an official's
consent to an appropriation condition consists of his eagerness, even knowing the condition, to
spend the funding. See Engdahl, supra note 68, at 67-70.
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appropriations. 145 President Bush's signing statement asserted that the notice
requirement of a funding bill concerning new military installations abroadl46
might violate "his constitutional grants of executive power as Commander in
Chief.,,147 President Bush kept the funds, yet treated the term as in effect
unconstitutional.
Similarly, faced with a Vietnam-like cut-off or troop-withdrawal
amendment, the President or his supporters could presumably argue that the
clear Iraq war authorization, as well as the continued funding, allow and
indeed require him to make his own decisions about whether to disengage his
forces and remove them from the theater of war. In other words, these other
authoritative congressional actions about Iraq put the Commander in Chief in a
position not subject to Vietnam-like conditions riding along on the
appropriations. Presidential supporters urge that our armed forces have been in
Iraq since 2003, as Congress authorized, to establish a secure, viable
democracy in the place of the former regime of Saddam Hussein.
Furthermore, the enemy has special characteristics of the post-9f11 world and
therefore the President must choose the core parts of the congressional
authorization and appropriation laws-the parts that authorize and fund the
effort--over the less essential part that contains the withdrawal term.
3.

The Significance of Congressional Decisions on Limited War

Much of the real tactical use of the "unconstitutional conditions"
argument involves its role after enactment when the President can use it to
justify brushing off or minimizing the conditions without seeming to be in
outright defiance. This part of the analysis will be discussed below concerning
presidential undermining of legislation during implementation after enactment.
At this point, the question concerns Congress' power to place limits on
how far or long the Commander in Chief may go in conducting a fully
authorized war. There does not appear to be any executive statement about
whether the Congress has power to enact new limits by way of riders during
148
wartime that supporters of presidential power could cite.
One particular
argument for the Commander in Chief does indicate his possible position, even
though it concerns presidential power in the absence of a particular operative
appropriation rider. During the Vietnam War, when President Nixon's armed
incursions into Cambodia required legal justification, then-Assistant Attorney
145 President Bush improperly moved funds around, violating the required notice to
congressional appropriators, for building installations as part of Iraq war preparations in 2002.
BOB WOODWARD, PLAN OF ATTACK 137 (2004).
146 The FY 2005 military construction appropriation included codification of a stricter
notice requirement for new military installations abroad.
147
Statement on Signing the Military Construction Appropriations and Emergency
Hurricane Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2005, 40 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. DOc. 2385-86
(2004).
148
See generally Powell, supra note 27 (citing previous executive opinions about
unconstitutional conditions on appropriations, although none concern the paramount question of
limiting the campaigns in a war). Powell's article cites, as the leading opinion about how the
commander-in-chief power trumps appropriation conditions, Power to Detail Officers of the
. Engineer Corps., 28 Op. Att'y Gen. 270 (1910) (regarding detailing officers to act as experts for
an Interior Department advisory board, notwithstanding a general condition in the
appropriations against details to bodies not expressly authorized by law).
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General William Rehnquist, among others, made the case. President Nixon
"has an obligation as Commander-in-Chief to take what steps he deems
necessary to assure the safety of American Armed Forces in the field.,,149 The
rationale for Cambodia operations was that enemy sanctuaries across the
Cambodian border posed an increasing threat to the safety of U.S. forces as
15o
well as to the program underway in South Vietnam. A president could argue
that the kind of commander-in-chief obligations that gave President Nixon
authority in Cambodia and Laos could today override an Iraq appropriation
rider.
Similarly, the President could say that an Iraq rider leading to a
specified withdrawal schedule would undermine the military effort that
Congress authorized and funded. A schedule for withdrawal might give
insurgents a greater chance of victory over the Iraqi government and put our
own troops-who Congress fully authorized and funded to be there-in greater
danger. Presidential power proponents could say that such a rider infringes the
Commander in Chief's responsibility and prerogatives.
As a political matter, an appropriation provision of any rigor would
only get enacted once the public feels sure that American forces are safer being
withdrawn, even though the President claims that the withdrawal itself exposes
them to peril.
The constitutional issue turns on legal considerations of authority. Its
answer comes from the constitutional concept of Congress' power to decide
whether only a limited war will be authorized. The Framers understood well
"the differences between 'perfect' and 'imperfect' war, or between 'general'
and 'limited' war.,,151 In granting Congress the constitutional power "to declare
war," the Framers handed Congress the instrument by which to choose which
level of war to declare. By "level of war," I mean the characteristics that
define the war's scope in broad terms of time, space, and nature: its duration,
such as a termination or withdrawal process; its geographic scope, such as the
decision of whether neighboring neutral countries are off-limits; and the nature
of the war in other respects, such as whether it consists of just naval (or, today,
naval-air) forces or also involves ground combat forces.
The first American war with another nation after the end of the
Revolutionary War is of great illumination regarding the Framers' intent. The
undeclared naval war or "Quasi-War" with France of 1798 occurred barely a
decade after the Constitutional Convention.
That conflict received
congressional authorization as a limited war. Congress limited it to a naval
war and defined the areas in which captures of enemy vessels were permitted 152
The Marshall Court passed upon several famous cases involving ships captured
153
as prizes during that war. It thereby set forth an eloquent jurisprudence from
149

Rehnquist, supra note 128, at 638.

See generally BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note I (discussing enemy sanctuaries
established across the Cambodian border).
lSI Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 24, at 2059.
152 See WORMUTH & FIRMAGE, supra note 12, at 60-63.
153 See, e.g., Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 169 (1804) (holding that a captain of a vessel
follows instructions from the President at his peril and that if those instructions are not strictly
warranted by law he will be legally liable for the consequences); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. 1,7,
ISO
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the Framers' era regarding limited war in general and Congress' ability to
define a war's characteristics as to geographic scope and nature.
This was no obscure encounter with some petty or backward opponent.
France in 1798 was one of the world's great powers; it had been our most
important ally in the Revolutionary War, and the issue of war with France in
the years after its own revolution aroused the most intense partisan feelings.
Moreover, the congressional limitations on the naval war were part of a
broader pattern. Congress had created an army prior to the war but felt
alarmed at its expense. It debated at length the approach to scaling back the
army-a debate in which John Marshall himself played a key part. Marshall
argued the issue with every indication that he in particular, and Congress in
general, could judge the advisability of a military buildup or stand-down
without trespassing on presidential prerogatives. 154
The Framers' concretely expressed concepts of a limited war with a
major opponent unmistakably contemplated that the President would carry out
his role as wartime Commander in Chief within overall limits defined by the
directions of Congress. When Congress authorizes a limited conflictmeaning a conflict within limits of space, time, and goals-the Framers did not
contemplate that the President could challenge Congress as improperly
interfering with his commander-in-chief prerogatives. Nothing could be
further from the treatment of the quasi-war with France. Congress set the
limits; the President had to obey. The President could not argue that the
commencement of war gave him the power to cast off limits set by Congress
and to have the nation in a conflict of a greater scope than Congress
authorized.
Rather, the President proceeds within the limits set for the war as any
commander would. He is the highest commander, the one who commands the
entirety of the military, and this supremacy of his command cannot be
unconstitutionally interfered with; but he is still commander of a war waged at
a level defined by the nation through Congress. The action of setting limits for
the war is deemed not to supplant or interfere with how any commander,
including the Commander in Chief, directs his forces within the set parameters
of the limited war.
During our memory, as in the Framers' time, Congress has authorized
limited wars. In 1983, it authorized the President's use of the armed forces in
Lebanon to perform certain functions, primarily peacekeeping, with an
eighteen-month limitation, an important precedent as the first such act of
155
Congress authorizing the use of force since the end of the Vietnam War. In
1993, Congress authorized the President's use of the armed forces in Somalia
for the very limited purpose of the protection of U.S. personnel and bases, with
an approximately five-month limitation. 156 Again, this was an important
precedent, continuing the pattern of congressional authorization for the Persian
15,31 (1801) (discussing Congress' legislating and how it controls the law of salvage); Bas v.
Tingy, 4 U.S. 37 (1800) (discussing Congress' powers to make and limit wars).
154 ALBERT BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 476-80 (1919).
ISS Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution, Pub. L. No. 98-1119, 97 Stat. 805 (1983).
156 Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-139, § 8151, 107
Stat. 1418, 1475-77 (1993); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L.
No.103-160, § 1512,107 Stat. 1547 (1994).
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Gulf War in 1991. Via these actions, Congress revived its authorizing function
after the doubts, confrontations, and defiance surrounding the Vietnam War
and the War Powers Resolution. As even Professors Bradley and Goldsmith,
presidential power supporters, conclude from this and from a broader historic
review: "This survey of authorizations to use force shows that Congress has
authorized the President to use force in many different situations, with varying
resources, an array of goals, and a number of different restrictions."ls7
4.

Limiting Provisions in the Midst of Wars

There is one remaining argument for presidential power supporters:
Even recognizing that Congress may define limits at the outset of wars, as it
did in 1798, it cannot impose them as funding terms during the combat.
Actually, Congress did redefine the limits of the 1798 war, expanding those
limits as it proceeded, but, nevertheless, the argument remains important to
examine. The argument could be that, in the Iraq context, in 2002 Congress
could have set limits in authorizing the conflict--on its scope or duration-but
instead Congress made a defmite and defining choice when it authorized the
conflict without imposing limits.
The argument would emphasize that Congress could but has not
completely stopped funding of the war by a cutoff. ls8 Hence, as long as
Congress continues to fund a war started without limits defmed at the outset,
the President may use the means placed at his disposal by that funding as he
sees fit to prosecute a war. In other words, when he deems himself forced to
decide whether to follow the original 2002-03 mission or to let his command
function be interfered with by later conditions on appropriations, he may
choose to honor the original authorization rather than the mid-course or "real
time"ls9 dictation of limits.
However, this view clashes with the understanding from the Framers'
time to the present of the constitutionally intended function of periodic
legislative funding as the channel for public action, not just at the beginning of
wars, but in their midst as well. It was no aberration when, during the Vietnam
War, Congress reacted against the Cambodia and Laos incursions by
exercising its power of the purse and adjusting the extent of ground war
combat.
From the English and colonial models, the Framers spoke of the power
of the purse not as a matter of unsupervised unconditional flows of war
160
funding, but as an ongoing means of parliamentary control.
The Framers'

Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 24, at 2077.
See Louis Fisher, Congressional Checks on Military Initiatives, 109 POL. SCI. Q. 739,
756-58 (1994--95) (discussing the efficacy of statutory cutoffs).
IS9 The phrase "real time" is from BANKS & RAVEN HANSEN, supra note 1, at 155 &
n.165.
160 In the limited naval war with France, an initial congressional authorization to fight
armed vessels on the high seas was succeeded by a later authorization to intercept vessels
sailing to French ports. Such a subsequent or "real time" change in the limits on war was taken
as plainly valid. The new limits were binding on presidential orders, and since President Adams
had issued an order authorizing broader action than permitted by the congressional statute, it
was held to be unlawful. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. at 179.
IS7
IS8
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desire for such ongoing control was epitomized by the constitutional provision
that appropriations for the army could never be for longer than two years. The
colonial-era wars of France and England in North America and the
Revolutionary War had schooled the Framers in the problems of long wars and
continuing legislative responsibility. 161 Neither text nor background suggests
the Framers envisaged the congressional limit-defining role to only occur at the
outset and never after hostilities commenced. The most important military
occupation in our history, the post-Civil War occupation of the former
Confederacy, was repeatedly adjusted and ultimately ended by the debate over
military appropriation riders. 162 Even in the period since the Vietnam War,
both the Lebanon (1983) and Somalia (1993) time limits came in legislation
after the initial commitment, without Presidents Reagan or Clinton arguing the
unconstitutionality of such post-commencement limits. In sum, Congress has
full authority to set terms of withdrawal by war-funding riders, whether a war
has debatable initial authorization, like the Vietnam War combat in Cambodia
and Laos, or clear initial authorization, like Iraq. Congress can define the
limits of a limited war and can do so by the terms in the funding appropriation.
There also seems to be no special reason that the characteristics of the
post-9fll world would reduce Congress' authority to place limits on the scope
of combat in Iraq. These characteristics, such as the irregular nature of enemy
forces and their ability to infiltrate and to strike domestically, may have
significance for some of the legal questions involving the President's power.
However, in terms of the distribution of the power to decide the scope of
funding and of combat in Iraq, the Iraq war is being conducted under regular
congressional authorization and funding. U.S. forces conduct combat in Iraq
predominantly by use of the regularly authorized and funded military services,
rather than by the less overtly authorized and funded special arrangements for
covert operations by intelligence agencies. Neither the conduct of the war nor
its costs are being kept secret from the U.S. and foreign publics. Congress can,
and does, openly debate the continuing commitment of men and materiel to
that conflict. Congress can, and does, openly decide the pros and cons of
committing men and materiel to Iraq rather than deploying them elsewhere or
preserving them. Presidents may try to persuade Congress to defer to them in
any conflict, be it the 1983 landing in Lebanon, the Vietnam War, or the Iraq
War, on the basis of the nature of the enemy, their possession of superior
intelligence, the necessity of continuing to engage the enemy without regard to
setbacks, and so forth. But if Congress votes otherwise, there is no principled
basis on which the President can usurp Congress' power of the purse, and
expend the nation's resources, in Iraq differently than in past wars, if the
nation, through Congress, decides to limit the scope of what it will authorize
and fund.

161
As has been previously discussed, the Revolutionary War demonstrated that Congress
should leave the direction of combat operations to the Commander in Chief, not that Congress
should give up the decisions on funding and, with these, on the scope of the war.
162 See Lalor, supra note 91, at lIlA 7.
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DEFENSE POLICY AND IRAQ GOVERNANCE PROVISIONS

War Policy Terms, Such as a Limit on Reservists' Combat Exposure
1.

War Policy

A different type of argument about war funding riders would arise if
Congress were to establish policy regarding American forces that, while
important, did not limit the war in the same way as a decision from the outset
on limited war or, later, on withdrawal of forces. In other words, let us put
aside the reasoning just relied upon for Congress using its power of the purse
to define the limits of a war in time, space, and nature. Taking as a given that a
war in Iraq will continue with some level of ground combat for a period of
time, may Congress make policy concerning how some of the military during
that war is used, or would that amount to meddling unconstitutionally with the
President's command prerogatives?163
The enactment of a particular rider shows that policy riders are, in fact,
coming. In 2004 and 2005 the press reported abuses of detainees in Iraq,
particularly at Abu Ghraib, as well as elsewhere, such as in Afghanistan and
Guantanamo Bay. On this subject, the majority party leadership in Congress
confined hearings to a minimum and allowed no vehicles for floor votes on
curative legislation.
However, when the emergency supplemental
appropriation that funds the Iraq war came to the House floor in spring 2005,
the proponents of legislative action, led by Rep. Ed Markey CD-Mass.) offered
an appropriation rider. 164 This swiftly achieved enactmene 65 is found in section
1031 of that appropriation. 166 As the press quoted the Administration's
spokesman, '''[i]f the Congress wants to use the appropriation process to
dictate government action, that's within their power, and the Department of
Justice did not oppose it. ",167
A sweeping provision, the "McCain
Amendment" rider about detainee treatment, further addressed the issue at the
end of2005. 168
A concrete example will help flesh out the considerations regarding a
policy rider that significantly affects what the President can do with some of
163 See Lieutenant Colonel Bennet N.
Hollander, The President and CongressOperational Control of the Armed Forces, 27 MIL. L. REv. 49, 73 (1965) (arguing that
operational control of the military is exclusively for the Commander in Chief).
164 The Markey rider was adopted via the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act
for Defense, The Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, H.R. 1268, 109th Cong., 1st
Sess., at lSI CONGo REC. HI518 (daily ed. March 16,2005). Rep. Markey had offered the
amendment to several bills, and his best exposition of the amendment was when it was offered
to the Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006, H.R.
2862, lO9th Cong., 1st Sess., at 151 CONGo REc. H4580 (daily ed. June 16,2005).
165 The appropriation received a vote of 420 to 2 on the House floor. Dana Priest, CIA's
Assurances on Transferred Suspects Doubted; Prisoners Say Countries Break No-Torture
Pledges, WASH. POST, Mar. 17,2005, at AI.
166 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror,
and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 1031, 119 Stat. 231,256.
167 Lichtblau, supra note 5, at A16 (quoting Department of Justice spokesman Kevin
Malden).
168 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109--48, §§ 1001-1006, 119 Stat. 2739,
2744 (2005).
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the troops under his command. For instance, Congress may worry about the
expanded and extended combat exposure of military reservists in Iraq and the
risk thereby posed to the viability of the reserve system. 169 It may view the
high level of reservists' combat exposure and losses as threatening both to
destroy the existing reserve system so that it no longer backs up the regular
military and to reduce unsustainably the ability of the reserve system to recruit
170
and train for future foreign and domestic duties.
A provision limiting the
combat exposure of reservists in Iraq might be good policy to avoid gravely
impairing the functioning of the reserve system. 171 On the other hand, skeptics
might say if the President does not choose such a step on his own, because he,
among other reasons, considers it likely to set back the war effort in Iraq, then
it would be bad policy.
Let us assume that the public comes to support this particular policy
(or whatever policy becomes the basis of a rider) so strongly that Congress
enacts it, even though the President does not support it. For balance, let us not
assume that professional military opinion on the question strongly condemns
either the Congress or the President on this issue. The military recognizes the
danger that Congress sees in the overuse of the reserves, yet understands the
President's dilemma in trying to carry on an unpopular operation without
enlarging the size of the regular Army.172
Congressional supporters of such a rider would argue that Congress
may put terms in its funding, even as to the use of different forces in an
authorized and funded war, to preserve national defense capacities and
interests that transcend Iraq-in this example, to maintain the imperiled
reserve system's viability. In a general way, they might draw strength from the
2004 Supreme Court decisions about detainees in Rasul v. Bush,17J and Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld,174 in which the Court rejected extravagant claims about the extent

See generally Lt. Cmdr. W. Kent Davis, Innovative Readiness Training Under 10
§ 2012: Understanding the Congressional Model for Civil-Military Projects, ARMy
LAW, July 2001, at 21; Andy P. Fernandez, The Needfor the Expansion of Military Reservists'
Rights in Furtherance of the Total Force Policy: A Comparison of the USERRA and ADA, 14
ST. THOMAS L. REv. 859 (2002); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OfFICE, FORCE STRUCTURE-ARMY
169

u.s.c.

IS INTEGRATING ACTING AND RESERVE COMBAT FORCES.

BUT CHALLENGES REMAIN,

GAO/NSIAD 00-162 (2000).
170 Such concerns are common, and have influenced the military's own planning. "[T]he
nation's community of formerly part-time soldiers [has] been badly strained by lengthy
deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan." Bradley Graham & Josh White, Army to Use Fewer
National Guard Troops in Iraq, WASH. POST, July 1,2005, at A17.
171 See Daniel Glick, Changing of the Guard: Feeling Betrayed in Iraq. Part-Time u.s.
Soldiers May Mutiny at the Polls, HARPER'S MAG., Aug. 1,2004, at 69.
172 For an example of the debate in this context, the Administration advanced a budget proposal
to reduce the authorized strength of the National Guard from 350,000 to 330,000. A strong political
reaction, emphasizing the heavy and perhaps unsustainable burden of the National Guard's continuing
deployment to Iraq, forced the Administration to drop the proposaL But critics, including Republican
governors, continued to note that the Administration was not providing the resources to sustain that
Iraq commitment. See Robert Pear, Bush Policies Are Weakening National Guard. Governors Say,
NY TIMES, Feb. 27, 2006, atAI0.
I7J
174

542 U.S. 466 (2004).
542 US. 507 (2004).
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to which the Commander in Chief could function beyond express support in
175
the laws.
But, this is not a provision about which the President has no counterarguments. Unlike President Truman seizing steel mills during the Korean
War without congressional authority, this concerns the Commander in Chief in
his function of commanding forces in the theater of war. Namely, executive
supporters may dispute Congress' right, by such a rider, to make policy that
would assuredly interfere with the Commander in Chief's decisions on what
use to make of the forces under his command.
2.

Criteria for Valid Wartime Policy Terms for the Military

Neither the Framers' intent nor subsequent elaboration has defined
precisely the characteristics of valid provisions dealing with military affairs.
Let us name three of the President's strongest concerns expressed in executive
branch legal pronouncements seeking to raise the commander-in-chief
authority to resist congressional provisions: intrusiveness as to the monopoly
of command itself; generality of measures, so as not to wrest authority over the
disposition of particular forces; and a threshold of funding impact, so that
Congress does not use its appropriations power as leverage to control
176
operational affairs.
First, broadly speaking, the President's strongest concerns lie with
intrusiveness into his monopoly of command itself. Aspects of this monopoly
include the choice of subordinate commanders, the arrangements for orders
and discipline, the responsiveness of subordinates and units to such orders and
discipline, and the manner in which subordinates make strategic and tactical
177
recommendations and carry out the decisions on such matters.
In this central area of the monopoly of command itself, a chief issue in
the 1990s, which brings out the complexity of analysis in this context,
concerned whether Congress could bar President Clinton from putting
American forces under foreign (particularly United Nations) command.
Politically, the issue concerned the effort by the Republican Congress to depict
cooperation by President Clinton with United Nations peacekeeping forces as
an encroachment on American sovereignty. 178
The Office of Legal Counsel of the Justice Department provided an
uncompromising opinion that a provision in a House bill to rule out such a
foreign command arrangement would infringe the commander-in-chief

175 But see Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 767-68 (1996) (accepting commanderin-chief power in discipline context).
176 No individual executive branch pronouncement sets forth a list of factors like this. Rather,
there is a tendency to provide sweeping assertions of the scope of the commander-in-chiefpower. An
examination of the contexts in which those assertions are made, as discussed below for each of these
factors, suggests these are the key ones.

177

Examples of cases and instances about these can be found in Hartzman, infra note 183,

178

The issue is placed in context, along with others, in Tiefer, supra note 45, at 239.

at 69.
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clause. 179 That opinion quoted many of the available scraps of significant
guidance about the commander-in-chief clause. The Supreme Court said in
1850 that "[a]s commander-in-chief, [the President] is authorized to direct the
movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at his command, and
to employ them in the manner he may deem most effectual .... ,,180 In 1895,
the Court said that the clause "vest[ s] in the president the supreme command
over all the military forces-such supreme and undivided command as would
be necessary to the prosecution of a successful war."181
In the opinion, the Office of Legal Counsel wrote, "the President may
determine that the purposes of a particular U.N. operation in which U.S.
Armed Forces participate would be best served if those forces were placed
under the operational or tactical control of an agent of the U.N .... " As such,
they determined that Congress may not, by appropriations condition or
otherwise, "prevent the President from acting on such a military judgment
concerning the choice of the commanders under whom the U.S. forces engaged
in the mission are to serve. ,,182
Yet, even on this core concern of command itself, the Bar Association
of the City of New York extensively canvassed the law and history and came
to a more neutral outcome. It concluded that such a provision would be most
unwise, yet not unconstitutional, because of the concurrent nature of Congress'
powers to make rules for the military.183 This conclusion is particularly striking
because the provision in question dealt with the essence of the clause, namely,
with command itself. In this sense, if we search for the qualities that
distinguish some provisions from others, this provision has a high degree of
"intrusiveness" inasmuch as it affects command directly and significantly.
That there was room for debate owes to a second quality, not typically
isolated, yet crucial in many of the commander-in-chief arguments: the extent
of generality in the congressional constraint, in the sense of addressing the
general overall structure and relations of the components of the armed forces
184
without getting into any specific mission for any particular component. For
all the intrusiveness and dubious wisdom of the "no U.N. command" rider, the
rider did not direct itself toward a particular operation or mission. It laid down
a general rule regarding command structuring. In that regard, it complied with
the constitutional provision that Congress shall make the rules for the military.
For example, Congress has guided the United States military through several
179 Placing of United States Armed Forces Under United Nations Operational or Tactical
Control, 20 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 182 (1996).
180 Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. 603,9 How. 603, 615 (1850).
181 United States v. Sweeny, 157 U.S. 281,284 (1895).
182 Office of Legal Counsel, supra note 179, at 185-86. The opinion also brings in a
discussion of the President's foreign policy powers and how this provision may interfere with
them.
183 Richard Hartzman, The Comm. on Mil. Affairs and Justice of the Ass'n of the Bar of
the City of New York, Congressional Control of the Military in a Multilateral Context: A
Constitutional Analysis of Congress's Power to Restrict the President's Authority to Place
United States Armed Forces Under Foreign Commanders in United Nations Peace Operations,
162 MIL. L. REv. 50, 105-07 (1999) (explaining why Congress' rulemaking power has primacy
over the President's command power in a context where the powers are concurrent).
184 Fisher, supra note 10, at 763 (pointing to appropriation restrictions that, without
contest, prohibited where U.S. forces could operate).

322

STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

42:291

successive waves of reforms since World War II to centralize and clarify its
command structure. ISS No one has questioned the constitutionality of Congress
undertaking such far-reaching command reorganization because the rules laid
down in these laws make up in generality for their seeming trespasses on the
command turf of the Commander in Chief.
Some kinds of quite general riders could operate very intrusively. For
example, many in Congress were critical at various times of Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld, notably in connection with the Abu Ghraib scandal
regarding detainee abuse. A rider phrased in nonspecific terms that transferred
military authority over detainees in the war zone to another Cabinet-level post,
such as the director of national intelligence, might superficially seem general
in nature. Yet, in context, such a provision would seem distinctly intrusive to
the Administration, aimed as it would be at congressional transfer of command
responsibility from a more controversial to a less controversial figure. The
President would be expected to prevail in branding such a provision as an
invasion of his prerogatives as Commander in Chief. Thus, generality is a
factor in the justification of appropriation provisions, but it takes more than
mere superficial generality to make a valid rider.
A third quality for appropriations terms concerns the extent to which
Congress uses a spending impact under a de minimis threshold to invade an
executive prerogative. Proponents of presidential power have used the example
that Congress cannot use its plenary power over appropriations to condition the
President's use of pens and paper upon what kind of pardons he signs with
them. 186 A similar question about conditions upon de minimis spending arises
when Congress uses its control over the appropriation of salaries for State
Department or Central Intelligence Agency officials to condition their conduct
of foreign and intelligence affairs. ls7 The same type of issue would arise if
Congress became so disenchanted with particular high officials in the
Department of Defense working on a large project as to prohibit the use of any
military appropriations for communicating with them. In contrast, a provision
prohibiting expenditures on that large project itself would certainly pass
muster, insofar as it not only purported to condition the spending of money, but
did, in fact, act upon the spending of significant appropriated funding.
These criteria of intrusiveness, generality, and threshold spending
impact can be applied to a potential provision about exposure of reservists to
combat. The President's supporters might well argue that taking away his
ability to order reserve units into the positions of full combat exposure intrudes
somewhat on his command powers. However, it is one thing for Congress to
say who can and cannot command certain kinds of units, but quite another for
it simply to say that certain uses are inappropriate for certain kinds of units,
whoever might command them. The provision at issue does not have as a
185 Congress' strictures in this regard culminated in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of
Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-433, 100 Stat. 992 (1986), undoubtedly
the boldest command reorganizing of the era. A good discussion is Peter M. Murphy &
William M. Koenig, Whither Goldwater-Nichols?, 43 NAVALL. REv. 183 (1996).
186 See, e.g., Todd David Peterson, Congressional Power Over Pardon & Amnesty:
Legislative Authority in the Shadow of Presidential Prerogative, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REv.
1225, 1250 (2003).
187 Nobleman, supra note 93, at 154-57.
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direct aim or mode of operation the displacing of presidential command. That
is, the command of the reserves is not taken away from the President and given
to someone else, nor are the reserves released from presidential discipline.
Rather, while certain uses of the reserves are ended, for all the authorized uses,
the President remains the Commander in Chief.
The real intrusiveness question concerns whether the provision
interferes with the conduct of campaigns and decisions on strategic and tactical
18s
disposition of forces. A proponent of presidential power might say that while
Congress can simply terminate funding for some kinds of units (such as
reservists), having funded them, it cannot speak to their uses. Yet by pulling
reservists out of combat, Congress has stayed at a level of generality about the
availability of certain forces, without usurping from the Commander in Chief
the strategic and tactical decisions to be made in using such forces. 189
A 1909 Attorney General opinion, mentioned in Part III, approved as
constitutional a congressional provision that eight percent of detachments
aboard naval vessels consist of marines. 190 A similar provision in the 1990s
precluded the U.S. military from engaging in construction activities (absent
explicit statutory authority)-a large hindrance after U.S. military intervention
191
in Haiti. Like the 1909 provisions, this one adopts a completely general rule
about the use of a kind of unit, without getting into strategic or tactical
decisions of the President and his subordinates. 192 In seeking to preserve the

188 Presidential power proponents would cite the broad dicta in opinions such as Training
of British Flying Students in the United States, 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 58, 61 (1941) ("[T]he
President's responsibility as Commander in Chief embraces the authority to command and
direct the armed forces in their immediate movements and operations .... "). While there are a
number of opinions with similar broad dicta, none seem to actually come to grips with questions
of the boundary between commander-in-chief authority regarding the conduct of wars, and
congressional authority to make general rules regarding substantial military resources.
189 Professor William Van Alstyne made an apt distinction between the propriety of
Congress prescribing the uses to be made of the military, and the impropriety of Congress
dictating minutely the President's strategy and tactics:

Congress .... also has a distinct enumerated power to provide for armies and navies,
and to prescribe the uses to be made for them. There is nothing inconsistent between this
proposition and another one, which arises from a combined reading of the declaration of
war clause and the President's power as Commander-in-Chief. This is the proposition that
under those circumstances in which Congress has affirmatively embraced a commitment to
belligerent activities overseas on a sustained basis, it may not presume to dictate the minute
strategy and tactics of the President's conduct of the authorized enterprise.
Symposium, The President's Powers as Commander-in-Chief Versus Congress' War
Power and Appropriations Power, 43 U. MIAMI L. REv. 17, 46 (1988).
190 27 Op. Att'y. Gen. 259, 260 (1909).
It is curious that the attorney general the
following year gave President Taft an opinion with a different tone about the relative powers of
President and Congress, as discussed in Part IILB.3.
191
Rosen, supra note 81, at 147.
192 Another issue, the right of the press to certain kinds of arrangements for covering the
war, has previously brought out this kind of analysis distinguishing the President's realm of
strategy and tactics from more general wartime military matters. Rana Jazayerli, Note, War and
the First Amendment: A Call for Legislation to Protect a Press' Right of Access to Military
Operations, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 131, 165 (1997); Keven P. Kenealey, Comment, The
Persian Gulf War and the Press: Is There a Constitutional Right of Access to Military
Operations?, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 287 (1992). To have the reserves reinforce or not reinforce a
particular front would get closer to presidential strategy prerogatives. But in this provision, they
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reserve system, Congress deals with an invaluable resource upon which it
allocates a large part of its military spending. When it uses appropriations
limitations to make policy about that system, it is making a very substantial
decision about raising and spending taxpayer funds as the vehicle for that
policy. In contrast to the criticism when Congress imposes conditions on de
minimis expenditures, such as imposing pardoning or diplomatic conditions on
salaries or office supplies, Congress has every right to use substantial
expenditures for this part of the military system as an occasion for making
policy.
This particular policy issue takes the constitutional analysis an extra
step, because the issue of handling the reserves happens to be one that the
Framers gave unusually extensive attention. 193 The Constitution makes
considerable textual references to the "Militia," today the National Guard
reservists of the individual states. In fact, the commander-in-chief clause
itself94 says "The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called
into the actual Service of the United States. ,,195 Article I, section 8, clauses 15
and 16, give Congress the power:
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the laws of
the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the
Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be
employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the
States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the
Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline
prescribed by Congress. 196
These provisions suggest that Congress does have reason to make
policy on such matters, even in wartime. Listing the congressional powers
with respect to the militia in Article I, Section 8 is not meant to resolve the
boundaries between the President and Congress, but only to clarify the
additional powers of Congress vis-a-vis the states with respect to their state
militias, a matter that might otherwise be ambiguous and difficult to resolve in
are treated distinctly in the nature of a vital human resource removed from an unfit use that will
destroy them, but otherwise not earmarked for or against any particular strategy in the war.
193 The argument for the proponents of presidential power would be that the Framers
might allow Congress to feel deeply and specially invested in nursing along a militia (or
reserves) system through "organizing" and "arming" it, but if the President's decision to send
the militia into types of combat that ought to belong to the regular army put in jeopardy that
precious investment, the Framers gave no sign of considering that to be Congress' concern.
194 There, the Framers carefully eliminated any distinction between the nature of
presidential command over the regular army and navy, and the nature of presidential command
over the militia once called up. So, presidential supporters might say that lowering the combat
exposure of reservists did not differ from doing so for some portion of the army or navy, and,
hence, interfered with the unity of command characteristic of the Commander in Chief.
195 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, c\. 1.
196 Presidential power proponents would note that these precisely delineated powers of
organizing and arming (Congress') and even training (states') come to an end at the boundary of
combat operations.
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a system of dual sovereignty.197 The Framers' attention to Congress' authority
over, and investment in, the reservists shows their expectation that Congress
would make rules for them, such as the provision under discussion, without
constituting an affront to the role of the Commander in Chief.
As the Committee of the New York City Bar said in discussing
legislative provisions about potential United Nations command, Congress'
powers to make regulations for the military often operate concurrently with the
President's command powers. In this instance, Congress has a long-term
policymaking role in keeping the reserve system viable, including recruitment,
training, benefits during and after service, and the effect of high levels of
combat casualties on all of these components. Congress has long acted
together with the career military in increasing the dependence of the regular
military on reserve units, to handle potential simultaneous involvements
without having to maintain an outsized, unsupportable regular military.
Congress has the responsibility to make policy with these goals in mind,
considering not just this war and this administration's tenure, but future wars
during future administrations. Therefore, this rider would be constitutional.
Still, this analysis has treated only congressional involvement with the
policy decisions of the U.S. government. Quite distinct legal considerations
come into play when the Congress desires to affect the policy of another
government, in this case the government ofIraq. We now tum to this topic.
Terms on Aid as to Iraqi Governance 198

B.

Different considerations arise with regard to military training and
reconstruction and other aid to the Iraqi government. Congress has made
decisions, including terms, regarding foreign aid, usually, but not invariably,
without running into constitutional disputes. However, Congress could test its
limits by using riders to make policy on issues deeply involved with
presidential wartime relations with our Baghdad ally. To ground the analysis
in the concrete, Congress could put terms on its military training and
reconstruction aid requiring governance concessions by the government of Iraq
to the disaffected Sunni minority. Presidential power proponents might dispute
such terms as unconstitutionally intruding upon the President's foreign affairs
prerogatives.
1.

Background of Foreign Aid

The background concerning foreign aid starts with aid during ("LendLease") and after ("Marshall Plan") World War II, and during the Korean War,
reflecting the close connection between war and aid to allies. 199 Congress
enacted the original template of the modem worldwide assistance program in
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which gave the President a variety of

197 See Perpich v. Dep't of Defense, 496 U.S. 334 (1990) (holding that Congress has the
right under Article I to order members of the National Guard to train outside the United States).
198 Iraq's fmances can be followed at Iraq Revenue Watch, supra note 2.
199 Meyer, supra note 46, at 71-72 & n.IS.
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independent spending powers and waiver authorities. 200 An uproar resulted
from Congress' discovery during the latter part of the Vietnam War that
President Nixon had conducted a secret war in Cambodia, partly through the
use of special powers over aid to the Sihanouk regime. 201 Amidst the initial
suggestions by presidential power proponents that the President had a
constitutional foreign affairs power over the use of foreign aid,202 Congress
tightened up aid control in the 1970s, particularly as to human rights. 203
In the 1980s, the relevant issues concerned aid to Central America.
President Reagan viewed aid to the Central American countries as part of the
effort to combat insurgencies characterized as a component of Nicaraguan
destabilization. Congress reacted against human rights abuses in EI Salvador
and Guatemala, such as extensive death squads and the covered-up rape and
murder of six American nuns by an army unit, by country-specific conditions
requiring sometimes detailed presidential certifications of progress. 204 The
executive-congressional struggle came down, on one side, to presidential
willingness to make certifications concerning improvements in human rights
that observers considered highly at odds with the truth. On the other side,
Congress supplemented its certification requirements with mechanisms such as
short-term aid disbursements coupled with timely presidential reporting and
205
creation of independent commissions to monitor and report on events.
By the mid-1980s, the particular issue had become aid to the
presidentially backed Contras fighting the Nicaraguan regime. Congress
enacted a series of laws, the Boland Amendments, taking advantage (as
discussed in Part rY06 of the available procedure of the appropriations rider to
impose various kinds of prohibitions on American aid to the Contras. Then the
Iran-Contra scandal burst. Congressional hearings revealed that the White
House had secretly supervised worldwide solicitation efforts, nicknamed "tin
cup diplomacy," to persuade regimes that it courted, many with zero intrinsic
interest in Central America, to give aid to the Contras. During the tin cup
diplomacy period,207 the Administration had not made any open constitutional
argument against the Boland Amendments. After the scandal broke,
presidential power proponents argued about the flawed nature of the
amendments-their changing nature and their inapplicability to White House
Most relevantly, these proponents argued the
solicitations. 20s

200
201

Pub. L. No. 87-195,75 Stat. 424 (codified in scattered sections of22 U.S.C.).
Meyer, supra note 46, at 76.
202 See generally Don Wallace, Jr., The President's Exclusive Foreign Affairs Powers
Over Foreign Aid: Part I, 1970 DUKE L.J. 293 (1970) (disputing that Congress can interfere in
the diplomacy that occurs as part of the distribution of foreign aid).
203 Meyer, supra note 46, at 76-82.
204 Id. at 100.
205 Id. at 82, 100.
206 Franck & Weisband, supra note 130, at 13-33.

207

For background on tin cup diplomacy, see generally Whiting, supra note 63.
Connie Ferguson Bryan, Note, Limiting the Use of Funds Appropriated for Executive
Functions: Is the 1984 Boland Amendment Constitutional?, 13 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 569,602
(1988).
20S

2006

Can Appropriation Riders Speed Our Exitfrom Iraq?

327

unconstitutionality of the amendments' impact on the President's conduct of
•
lorelgn
a f~·
larrs. 209
The arguments continued, in a different form, into the administration
of President George H. W. Bush. As Vice President, Bush had played a part in
the solicitations of aid for the Contras. While Congress sought to enact
provisions nailing down an express prohibition against solicitations, President
Bush fought these by veto.
As the argument evolved, President Bush fought to draw this line. He
conceded that Congress could prohibit quid pro quo arrangements, in which
the executive branch offered aid to third-party countries in return for their
making contributions to the Contras or similar diplomatic causes. However, he
opposed Congress' efforts to prohibit executive solicitations, in which thirdparty countries were asked to contribute to such Administration causes without
an express promise of aid to them as a quid pro quo. This specific issue of tin
cup diplomacy will not recur in Iraq, but it does suggest where presidential
power proponents might fight to draw the line.
In their most wide-ranging form, the aid-related arguments during the
Reagan and Bush administrations drew on the general presidential
constitutional power over foreign affairs. Reciting this familiar argument at
length is not necessary, for so little of it has to do with congressional
appropriations. Even for appropriations, the precedents cited by presidential
power proponents usually deal with the easier case for the executive when
Congress puts foreign affairs conditions on its appropriations for the State
Department or for officials' salaries. 2lO While this holds some intrinsic interest,
it does not relate to the situation presented in Iraq, where Congress does not
merely provide the facilitating appropriations for the functioning of American
officials, but, more importantly, provides massive appropriations of
reconstruction and other aid for that country.
Controversies over the terms of aid that continued during the Clinton
and Bush administrations further fill in this picture, often with very different
political contexts from those of the 1980s Central America. On one occasion, it
was the Democratic administration of President Clinton making highly dubious
certifications, such as decisions about Mexico's drug enforcement. 2Il On
another major issue, Congress had long imposed an anti-abortion term on
international family planning assistance. President Clinton sought to reverse
his predecessor's policy and to relax the basis for providing such aid, but he
could not overcome Congress' repeatedly imposed policy terms, however
much they interfered with his foreign policy.212
Conversely, President George W. Bush subsequently sought to reverse
the Clinton policy, and to restore the earlier policy of the previous President
Bush, in this regard, which was to tighten up the basis for providing such aid.
C'

209

Id.

For background on these conditions, see Nobleman, supra note 93.
Mark A. Chinen, Presidential Certifications in Us. Foreign Policy Legislation, 31
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 217, 240--42 (1999).
212 Tobey E. Goldfarb, Comment, Abstinence Breeds Contempt: Why the Us. Policy on
Foreign Assistance for Family Planning is Cause for Concern, 33 CAL W. INT'L L.J. 345, 351
(2003).
210
211
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This obliged him to deal with the "Kemp-Kasten" amendment, which would
only bar aid to China upon specific findings of aid being used for a forbidden
coercive abortion policy.213 Once again, as with the 1980s aid to Central
America, a President dealt with aid requirements as he wished by making a
determination that observers found incredible, which is important to recall in
214
anticipating the implementation of any congressional aid riders.
2.

Application to Iraqi Aid

A major debate about terms on aid occurred in late 2003, relatively
early in the Iraq counter-insurgency, but when doubts had already arisen about
2lS
the President's course.
President Bush sought from Congress a massive
appropriation of $18.4 billion for Iraq reconstruction aid, expected to last for
several years. A strong bipartisan congressional coalition would have made
half of the package into a loan administered through the World Bank. The
Senate voted 51 to 47 to impose the requirement, producing front-page
headlines that "Senate Defies Bush on Iraq Assistance,,,216 and the Senate
217
conference committee delegation included a majority who had voted for it.
That Senate action reflected a powerful public mood when faced with the scale
of aid, which spanned the ideological spectrum. There never was any hint of a
constitutional objection to the term. Rather, it was dropped in conference when
two of the Senate conferees absented themselves and voted by proxy to reverse
their earlier support, a surprising reversal that apparently resulted from
personal lobbying by the President. 21S
The scale of the 2003 aid appropriation meant that while President
Bush would annually call for military training aid, he would not need to seek
another appropriation for reconstruction aid for several years. Still, the
President would call for additional aid for one purpose or another, and interim
legislation might contain provisions about the aid. Another detail about the
2003 aid appropriation's enactment showed why proponents of presidential
power could be expected to object to some terms. When President Bush signed
the 2003 aid act into law, his statement did, in fact, single out a provision for a
constitutionally based objection, namely, the provision creating an inspector
general. The passage in his signing statement with the objection read:

213 Melissa Upreti, The Impact of the "Global Gag Rule" on Women's Reproductive
Health Worldwide, 24 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REp. 191, 197 (2003).
214 Kaci Bishop, Comment, Politics Before Policy: The Bush Administration, International
Family Planning, and Foreign Policy, 29 N.C. J. INT'LL. & COM. REG. 521,533-39 (2004).
21S For an elaboration of the early doubts, see Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Iraq and the Future of
United States Foreign Policy: Failures of Legitimacy, 31 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 149
(2004).
216 Jonathan Weisman, Senate Defies Bush on Iraq Assistance, WASH. POST, Oct. 17,
2003, at AI.
217 Tiefer, supra note 4, at 211.
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Title III of the Act creates an Inspector General (IGY'9.
Title III shall be construed in a manner consistent with the
President's constitutional authorities to conduct the Nation's
foreign affairs, to supervise the unitary executive branch, and
as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. The [Coalition
Provisional Authority] IG shall refrain from initiating,
carrying out, or completing an audit or investigation, or from
issuing a subpoena, which requires access to sensitive
operation plans, intelligence matters, counterintelligence
matters, ongoing criminal investigations by other
administrative units of the Department of Defense related to
national security, or other matters the disclosure of which
would constitute a serious threat to national security. no
By this statement, President Bush put limits on the oversight of the Iraq
reconstruction aid by the inspector general office chartered by a congressional
221
rider.
This record about past foreign aid issues indicates that future proposed
terms regarding reconstruction and other aid for Iraq might well produce a
debate along the following lines. This example concerns terms to condition a
large portion of aid upon governance concessions towards Iraq's disaffected
Sunni minority. That Sunni minority, which held sway during Saddam
Hussein's regime, forms the base of the insurgency. For purposes of analysis,
assume that the American public, and hence a bipartisan majority in Congress,
becomes convinced that the insurgency will not be sufficiently pacified to
permit a withdrawal of American forces unless Baghdad is pressured to make
substantial governance concessions to the Sunnis. Assume further that the
President balks at threatening to cut off the aid funding to the regime in
Baghdad, absent such concessions to the Sunnis, particularly if Congress
purports to empower independent watchdogs to make sure the pressure is
really applied. 222 This Article addresses the constitutional issue of whether
Congress has the authority to place tough foreign aid conditions on war
funding.
219 The statement read "an Inspector General (IG) for the CPA." The CPA, or Coalition
Provisional Authority, transferred sovereignty to the Government of Iraq, and administration of
the aid then went to the State Department. A special inspector general's office for the aid was
created in the State Department.
220 Statement on Signing H.R. 3289, the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for
Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004, 39 WEEKLY COMPo PRES.
Doc. 1549 (Nov. 6, 2003).
221 Presidential issues about the independence of inspectors general are treated in Charles
Tiefer, The Constitutionality of Independent Officers as Checks on Executive Abuse, 63 B.U. L.
REv. 59 (1983).
222 Background on the reasons why a change in governance for the Sunnis might become
an option of interest to the public and Congress for speeding our exit from Iraq can be found in
Peter W. Galbraith, Iraq: Bush's Islamic Republic, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Aug. 11, 2005; Peter W.
Galbraith, Iraq: The Bungled Transition, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Sept. 23, 2004, at 70; Peter W.
Galbraith, How to Get Out of Iraq, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, May 13,2004; Public International Law
& Policy Group, Establishing a Stable Democratic Constitutional Structure in Iraq; Some Basic
Considerations, 39 NEW ENG. L. REv. 53,67-70 (2004).
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On the one hand, Congress would likely face no constitutional hurdle
in proposing terms that earmark the aid funding so that a specific portion of it
went to the disaffected Sunni minority. Nor would Congress likely face much
difficulty in creating reporting requirements, such as asking the President for
reports on the progress of the regime in Iraq toward changing the governance
of the Sunni minority. However, earmarking and reporting do not go as far as
the public and Congress may demand. The impact of earmarking funding for
Sunni areas may be blunted due to lack of security during wartime and other
circumstances that limit how much or how fast aid can be furnished in Sunni
areas. Bland Administration reporting alone will not change the governance of
the Sunnis. So, Congress may be inclined to vote for stronger medicine.
On the other hand, presidential power proponents may well dispute the
validity of provisions heavy-handedly intruding upon the President's
constitutionally granted foreign affairs discretion regarding treatment of a
wartime ally.223 If the requisite findings must be made, not by the executive
branch, but by the Government Accounting Office (GAO), a legislative branch
agency, such proponents would find aid conditions constitutionally
unacceptable. It still would not be acceptable if the findings were made by an
inspector general within the executive branch who has some statutory degree
of independence from the President's direct control. It is a much closer
question whether such provisions would be deemed constitutionally
objectionable by presidential proponents if, on the one hand, Congress let the
executive branch itself make the findings, but, on the other hand, Congress (as
it did with some Central American aid in the 1980s) created an independent
advisory commission to report on these matters. 224
The foregoing analysis suggests its own resolution. In non-war
contexts, Congress has had a virtually free hand in imposing conditions on aid.
Presidents have dealt with this as President Bush dealt with the Kemp-Kasten
provision about family planning aid-by making determinations that observers
find incredible. 225
In contrast with non-war contexts, in wartime Congress arguably does
not have quite so free a hand in imposing conditions on aid. But Congress also
does not lack authority merely because of presidential positions of the past. In
the 1970s, Congress regained control of aid to Southeast Asia after discovering
President Nixon's uses of aid to Cambodia. 226 In the 1980s, Congress regained
control of financing of insurgencies by means of conditional aid, the Boland
Amendments, and the Iran-Contra investigation. 227 Earmarking alone will not
reach the important aspects of Iraqi governance, which Congress may wish to
223 That is, they may dispute provisions conditioning increments of aid upon fmdings
about bringing Sunnis into the government, altering governmental arrangements to suit the
Sunnis, giving them enhanced local autonomy, or other specific steps amounting to conditions
about changed governance rather than just about earmarking aid.
224 For a discussion of the analogous controversy over 1980s Central American aid
conditions, see Amy S. Griffin, Constitutional Impediments to EnforCing Human Rights
Legislation: The Case of El Salvador, 33 AM. U. L. REv. 163 (1983).
225 That is, President Bush eschewed defeating the provision on the basis of some
hypothetical constitutional basis, but handled it by policy arguments in the Congress and by
post-enactment implementation in ways that achieved the outcome he desired.
226 Franck & Weisband, supra note 130.
227 Meyer, supra note 46, at 87.
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cure or at least to address by means of aid terms. The inspector general and the
GAO's exposures of large-scale contracting abuses in Iraq suggest the
continued need to have such entities examine compliance with terms. Carried
to its ultimate limit, the presidential power proponents' notion of a unitary
executive would mean that the task of critically assessing what Baghdad does
with our aid falls to the same officials tasked with making the Iraq situation
look as favorable as possible. Accordingly, this rider would be constitutional.
Some might imagine that the canvassing of these various types of Iraq
appropriation riders brings to a close the analysis of what will happen upon
their enactment. Before the 1980s that might have been true. However, in more
recent years, Presidents have found a new and different context for dealing
with provisions like appropriation riders, namely, the use of post-enactment
tactics such as pronouncements undermining such provisions in presidential
signing statements. It is this context to which the analysis now turns.

v.

AFTER ENACTMENT: PRESIDENTIAL UNDERMINING

A.

1.

Presidential Undermining

Why the President May Choose Not to Defy and Not to Comply

This article has repeatedly attributed the debate about the
constitutionality of war and aid funding terms to presidential power proponents
rather than the President himself. For tactical reasons, the President may only
imply his constitutional position during congressional consideration of
provisions, rather than lock himself into an express and clear stance. Presidents
may not want to make a commitment to veto any bill carrying the provision,
particularly since its most likely vehicle would be a major defense spending
bill. Presidents may care more about other aspects of such a defense spending
bill, including its overall size, its allocations to key accounts, and the timing of
its passage. Conditions about the conduct of wars may raise important
problems without Presidents choosing to use their strongest weapons such as
veto threats, because Presidents reserve their strongest weapons for fights over
war appropriations' size, allocation, and timing.
Such presidential prioritizing of issues may be, but need not be, a
betrayal of constitutional ideals or otherwise deeply objectionable. The most
honored wartime Presidents have sometimes put the most important issues of
national commitment legislation first, and handled their objections to lesser
issues such as constraints included as riders later. To take a particularly
respected example mentioned earlier, in 1940 President Roosevelt obtained
passage of the bill authorizing the first peacetime draft only by including a
condition against using draftees outside the Western Hemisphere, and even
228
Had President
then only with the margin of one single vote in the House.
Roosevelt made a constitutional issue about that condition, he would have lost
the bill, leading to a very great setback for American preparedness for World
War II. President Roosevelt's subsequent military occupation ofIceland, which
is outside the Western Hemisphere, is cited by presidential power proponents
228

See supra text accompanying note 98.
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to support their argument that a President may sign a bill and later deal with its
asserted infringements of his constitutional powers.
In a different but related vein, is a decision made by President George
H. W. Bush at a critical moment in the January 1991 congressional
consideration of a resolution to authorize the Gulf War. The President's more
anti-congressional advisers, notably Secretary of Defense Cheney, urged him
at that critical juncture to rely upon his own unilateral constitutional warmaking power. Instead, the President asked Congress not merely for its support
for him to exercise unilateral presidential power, but also for its authorization
based on Congress' own powers, as expressed clearly in the presidentially
endorsed language of the Gulf War Resolution. This deference to Congress'
legislative responsibility both established a major precedent confirming
presidential responsibility to respect Congress' powers and enabled President
Bush to win the Senate vote with bipartisan support and to lead successfully a
united nation in a broadly supported war. Like Roosevelt in the 1940s, Bush in
1991 proved himself a superior wartime President because he did not insist on
the Presidency's supremacy regarding all decisions about war.
So, the President may not lock himself in by a veto threat, nor actually
veto the bill carrying the Iraq rider. These two polar alternatives less
interesting analytically than a third, which deserves the closest study.
First, the President may starkly and avowedly defy the rider. A few
times in history, Presidents have famously done so. As previously mentioned,
when Congress halved the appropriation President Theodore Roosevelt had
requested for a Navy fleet to sail around the world, he is said to have
responded that he would have the fleet sail halfway around the world and leave
it up to Congress if they wanted to bring it back. 229 But, defiance has its
disadvantages. Any Iraq provision which has enough strength to get through
both houses of Congress against the resistance of the President and of his
party, which controls the agenda in both houses, presumably has public
opinion clearly behind it. Defying such a provision would be defying the
public.
Moreover, a voting majority in Congress, with clear public support
behind it, has ways of retaliating. In 1973, President Nixon defied a Vietnam
War funding cutoff and continued bombing by using funding legerdemain to
get around the provision. Congress responded by placing similar provisions on
230
each of a host of bills it considered. Whatever the congressional response, if
the President outright defies an Iraq funding provision, Congress' ability to
place similar provisions on other bills means his defiance will lock him into
repeatedly fighting an issue on which, politically, he has previously lost.
Second, the President may comply with the rider, even as far as to
mollify congressional critics. For all the steps President Franklin Roosevelt
took in 1940-41 regarding World War II, he did not intervene in the war,
which would have brought a colossal clash with Congress. Instead, he brought
Congress along with him by seeking legislation on preparedness and Lend229
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231

Lease. He kept enough good faith with Congress that it tolerated his form of
naval conflict with Germany in the North Atlantic and his oil embargo against
Japan in the Pacific.
Compliance now with an Iraq rider would have similar benefits in
keeping a restive Congress on board with aspects of the Iraq effort that are not
resolved by the rider itself Moreover, compliance avoids the consequences of
secret defiance, once it is no longer secret. Both President Nixon with his
secret bombing war in Laos, and President Reagan with his secret support of
the Contra war, elicited a storm of adverse reaction when their secrets came
out.
The President, however, has powerful bases not to concede the full
measure of what congressional critics seek in an Iraq rider, as long as he can
avoid the pitfalls of either secret or stark defiance. Being Commander in Chief
and chief of national diplomacy has constitutional significance both in the
theoretical and, just as importantly, in the practical sense. That is, the President
has more than merely his theoretical arguments for respecting his role as
Commander in Chief and diplomatic leader. In addition, the President has
enormous scope, by use of his practical powers in these roles, to shape what
follows from an Iraq rider. This can be accomplished by interpretation and by
the choice of the implementation approach. Currently, the President has at his
disposal tremendous institutional machinery, since he not only controls all of
the executive branch, but also has the support of the majority party in
Congress. President Reagan did not have this, particularly in 1987-88 when
both houses were Democratic; even President Roosevelt in a sense did not
have this in 1941, when a conservative coalition had control of much of the
committee machinery in Congress. The President need not concede an Iraq
rider's full import so long as he can find a way to mobilize his strength.
2.

The Signing Statement

Post-enactment, the President may display several unexpected legal
tools for handling war and aid funding terms to which he objects.
Congressional provision sponsors must anticipate not merely a reiteration of
the pre-enactment arguments, but the use of those arguments by the machinery
now to be discussed, as a basis for limited compliance with the appropriation
terms.
The pivotal post-enactment step has become the presidential signing
statement. 212 Before the 1980s, what Presidents said or wrote while signing a
bill had no more formal significance than any other presidential speech or
issuance. President Reagan began to issue such signing statements
231 By urging preparedness as a means of national defense, he brought Congress along with him
on a draft army and on spending for military installations and equipment. Similarly, by urging the
providing of Lend-Lease arms resupplies to Great Britain and, after mid-1941, to the Soviet Union, he
brought Congress along with bolstering the countries that were currently resisting Nazi aggression and
that would be the United States' future allies once war began. His approaches reduced the resistance
from the substantial portion of the public and Congress that wanted to bolster the country's position
against future war while not wanting to get involved in the war prematurely at all.
232 Kristy L. Carroll, Whose Statute is it Anyway?: Why and How Courts Should Use
Presidential Signing Statements When Interpreting Federal Statutes, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 475,
477 (1997).
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systematically, as a new mechanism for proclaiming positions and, if possible,
establishing them as having some authority.2J3
His successor, President
George H. W. Bush, wished to reassert presidential authority after the IranContra scandal had reduced his position's authority, particularly vis-it-vis a
refractory Congress taking active lawmaking and oversight steps against
executive abuses. Just as Congress saw the passage of defense spending bills as
an occasion to implement riders dealing with such abuses, the President saw
passage of such bills as occasions for signing statements that would proclaim
his constitutional ability to trump those riders. 234 President Clinton made a
partly muted resort to such riders,235 and President George W. Bush picked up
where his father had left off. President W. Bush issued more than one hundred
signing statements by 2006, greatly expanding upon the scope and character of
such statements issued by prior Presidents. 236
A type of signing statement that might also be called a "brushing-off
statement" proclaims a presidential constitutional prerogative as the basis for a
path combining the surface appearance of respect for the legislation with the
reality of little or no change in direction. Such a brushing-off statement notes a
provision in the bill that assertedly transgressed the commander-in-chief or
foreign affairs powers, and summarizes the general nature of the presidential
objection.237 Then, the statement announces that the President will interpret the
provision in light of his constitutional powers. It may stop there. Or,
alternatively, it may take a provision intended as a broad or definite prohibition
and announce that in light of the constitutional objection, the President will
treat it as narrow or merely advisory.238
Part of what a signing statement accomplishes for the President is to
seize the initiative. Enactment of bills with offending provisions may constitute
defeats for Presidents in the legislative forum. Evidently, their arguments, legal
and otherwise, did not win sufficient adherents or, because the President did
not care enough about the issue, may well have received little expenditure of
political capital. By the time of signing, the point has long passed when the
President could have the provision excised or changed. The President then lets
his legal counsel, who is the statement's author, take the image of his authority
in dealing with the provision, without the President ever having to expend any
233 Frank B. Cross, The Constitutional Legitimacy and Significance of Presidential
"Signing Statements," 40 ADMIN. L. REv. 209, 212 (1988).
234 Tiefer, The Semi-Sovereign President, supra note 33, at 44.
235 See Walter Dellinger, Memorandum for Bernard N
Nussbaum, Counsel to the
President, 48 ARK. L. REv. 333 (1995) (approving signing statements as a vehicle for
presidential prouncements, but disapproving them as a means for making legislative history).
236 Elisabeth Bumiller, For President, Final Sayan a Bill Sometimes Comes After the
Signing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16,2006, at 11.
237 Carroll, supra note 232, at 493 n.l02 (citing statement by President Reagan that found
a provision prohibiting aid to the Contras to conflict with the President's foreign affairs
powers).
238 See, e.g., Statement on Signing H.R. 2673, The Department of Defense Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic
Influenza Act of Dec. 30, 2005, Pub. 1. No. 109-148,2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. ("Many provisions of
the CAA are inconsistent with the constitutional authority of the President to conduct foreign
affairs, command the Armed Forces .... The executive branch shall construe as advisory the
provisions of the CAA that purport to: (I) direct or burden the Executive's conduct of foreign
relations .... ").
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actual political capital with arguments, promises, or threats to legislators or
other significant political figures.
Moreover, by interpreting away the offending aspects of the provision,
the President's lawyers get to pronounce a narrowed version of it without
having to persuade anyone to agree. This permits a President to declare
something more vague and less hard-edged than outright defiance (a highly
controversial approach),239 yet avoids the accusation that the ensuing narrow
treatment of the provision is furtive or covert. Meanwhile, executive civilian or
military officials who might naturally obey the manifestly broad and
mandatory intent of the law now have a seemingly authoritative direction from
on high to veer off with a very different notion that all but suspends the law.
The overwhelming majorIty of brushing-off statements went
completely without public or congressional attention. Often, they concerned
minor provisions or obscure issues. Or, they did not garner much attention
because the stated objections did not signal any serious confrontation with
Congress. Observers may have no serious concern about the signing statement,
knowing that something like it occurred on a similar bill the year before. 240
Presidents George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush only occasionally used
signing statements to stake out positions on national security of real
significance. An important example was President Bush's signing statement
accompanying the McCain Amendment on detainee treatment. 24\
However, faced with an Iraq war rider, a President may find great
value in a brushing-off statement as the start of pursuing a course largely
unaffected by supposedly mandatory congressional directions in a rider. In
signaling his approach via a signing statement, the President would not
reawaken echoes of Iran-Contra or of President Nixon's secret bombing of
Laos, for he would not be creating distance between his stance and the relevant
legal authority through self-discrediting subterfuge or mendacity. Instead, he
would publicly and overtly shrug off the rider's mandatory force by resorting
to a facially proper executive power and would use official and open channels
to proclaim that his own will trumps that of any officials (e.g., the Joint Chiefs
of Staff) who might otherwise believe their duty consists in following the
legislation.
It deserves note that this presidential evasion of statutory war restraints
may be, but need not always be, a betrayal of constitutional ideals or otherwise
deeply objectionable. The most honored wartime Presidents have sometimes
significantly stretched such restraints. To take a particularly celebrated
239 For a discussion of the issue of presidential outright refusal to comply with an
appropriation restriction, see Peter Raven-Hansen & William Banks, From Vietnam to Desert
Shield: The Commander in Chief's Spending Power, 81 IOWA L. REv. 79,117-26 (1995).
240 For example, intelligence authorization laws carry a classified annex which contains
the specific subtotals for particular spending subjects, since those numbers are classified.
Presidents developed a habit of putting in their signing statements that the classified annex
lacked the force of law, since they took the position that a Congress that did not carry out the
full and open procedures of enactment for the classified annex had not, in fact, enacted it. The
objection lacked any practical weight because neither Presidents nor their supporters wanted the
subtotals voted upon openly like other legislation.
24\ Statement on Signing H.R. 2863, The Department of Defense Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic
Influenza Act of Dec. 30, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148,2005 u.S.C.C.A.N. 550.
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example, in 1940 President Roosevelt traded fifty World War I destroyers with
242
Britain in return for long-term base leases.
At a time when the Navy was
desperately struggling to resolve its shortfall in ships to meet the sudden
preparedness emergency, a statute precluded him from turning over those
destroyers unless they were declared surplus. It strained statutory language to
declare the fifty destroyers surplus and thus available for transfer to Britain.
President Roosevelt's persuasion of Congress eventually proved to be an
243
esteemed balancing act rather than a disservice to the law.
In a different
vein, President Clinton arranged the commitment of peacekeeping troops to
Bosnia in 1996 by convincing Congress that they would be there for just a
single year. 244 A decade later, American troops remain there. In context, the
whole operation is generally seen as a success, even considering the stretch
involved in calling it a one-year commitment. Presidential strain on statutory
war restraints can be vindicated partly by the President's overall honesty and
deference to Congress, and partly by the practical success of his policies
abroad.
3.

Interpretive Tactics

After starting with a brushing-off statement, the President may then
seek concrete interpretation-guided courses of action. These approaches yield
little to Congress in the making of war and aid policy. They may be called
"minimizing interpretations," although they can reduce the legislation to the
extent that the enacted law is a bare shadow of its intent.
Concrete examples from each of the categories previously discussed
help here. Suppose the President faces a supplemental appropriation bill of war
and aid funding for Iraq with three riders attached by a bipartisan majority of
Congress over the resistance of presidential supporters. One rider states that
none of the funds shall be spent on the war unless the Defense Department
develops and implements a plan for withdrawal of regular ground combat
forces from Iraq as speedily as described conditions permit in a maximum of
two years. A second rider states that none of the funds shall be available for
funding units of reservists in Iraq unless they are assigned or reassigned so as
to minimize their combat exposure within six months. The third rider states
that a quarter of the military training or reconstruction aid in the bill shall not
be available unless the Secretary of State certifies that the government of Iraq
has made substantial progress in satisfying the objections of the legitimate
Sunni leadership to the existing government in Baghdad.
In a signing statement, the President would set forth his objections,
given his commander-in-chief and foreign affairs powers, to these provisions
242 Joel R. Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency and Executive
Agreements, 86 CAL. L. REv. 671, 741 (1998).
243 This is partly because history judges presidential actions, perhaps unfairly, from what
evenruates. Once the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 forced the United
States into war, divisions in the public and Congress between interventionists and isolationists
were forgotten, and FDR's pushing the envelope on what he could do in anticipation of war
was, in retrospect, honored on all sides.
244 David G. Delaney, American War in the 1990s, 26 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 261, 264
(2002) (reviewing DAVID HALBERST AM, WAR IN A TIME OF PEACE: BUSH, CLINTON, AND THE
GENERALS (2001».
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and warn of their impact on troop safety. The statement would impose
interpretations upon them consistent with the aforementioned objections and
declare the imperative of treating them as non-mandatory. Gradually thereafter,
the President would make known those minimizing interpretations.
As for the troop withdrawal rider, the President's withdrawal schedule
would go no further for the next year and a half than it had before. He might
then state a hope that conditions would allow withdrawal of the combat units in
the last quarter of the two-year period, although if conditions did not permit
this, he would not be obliged to implement the withdrawal. By the end of the
rider's withdrawal schedule, the President would still have a high number of
troops committed, and would be implementing his own policies with minimal
regard for the rider.
In response to the rider regarding reservists, the President would
announce that reserve units should not be used as assault spearheads on
insurgent strongholds except under unique circumstances. Additionally,
commanders should contemplate reducing the use of reservists in operations
expected to have high casualties, subject to all other tactical considerations.
The President would also indicate that implementation of the new legislation
should produce virtually no change in their existing pattern of deployments, in
which reservists suffer casualties in their hazardous duties (apart from assault
spearheads or high-casualty operations).
The President would respond to the Sunni conditional aid rider by
instructing the Secretary of State to certify the Sunni role in governance based
on Baghdad's reply to a formal inquiry. In other words, the Secretary of State
would take Baghdad's word on the subject upon which the rider specifically
intended her not to rely. The Secretary's certification decision would discount
the seemingly significant communications by Sunni leaders themselves,
regardless of whether these occurred directly, through indirect channels, or
through the media.
Working through these concrete examples brings out how the
resolution of war powers issues consists, at this stage, of much more than an
analysis of texts and contexts. Once Congress has actually moved proposals all
the way through to enactment, and the resolution of the issues involves the
interaction of the executive and legislative branches, the war powers debate
concerns the dynamic institutional and political interactive processes. This has
been the theme of some of the best contemporary analyses of war powers
•
245
issues.
What happens after brush-off statements and minimizing
interpretations depends on the extent to which the institutional operations of
the House and Senate either serve to shield the executive branch against
criticism, pressure, and political consequences, or, alternatively, serve to
reinforce such attacks. These issues are reflected in the different constellations
of presidential-congressional interaction at three different stages of the
Vietnam War. At the first stage, in 1964, President Johnson faced an
institutionally supportive Congress. Not only did his own party hold majorities
in the Senate and House with party-leader support, but the committee leaders
245 See, e.g., Ford, supra note 66, at 613 (discussing how war powers issues exist in "an
ongoing process of decisionmaking").
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supported him as well. His gross deceptions and deviousness in securing the
Tonkin Gulf Resolution, which afforded him wide open authorization to
escalate the war, occurred without any institutional challenge.
By 1966, President Johnson still had floor majorities and party leader
support, but he had lost the protection of the key committee leader, Chairman
William Fulbright of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Fulbright held
tough, televised oversight hearings about the Johnson Administration's empty
assurances of victory. This did not bring the war to an end, but it did lead in
two directions: toward an increase in congressional capacity to secure
compliance with its legislative directions about the Vietnam War, and toward
the elaboration of overarching principles that led to the dramatic 1970s
legislation reasserting Congress' role in many aspects of national security and
foreign relations. Still, the President had many cards to play, such as invoking
the Food and Foraging Act,246 which allowed the Defense Department to incur
248
obligations without appropriations under some247 circumstances.
By 1974, President Nixon not only faced floor majorities of the other
party, he faced an institutional apparatus, from committees to member
organizations, capable of sustained legislative and oversight effort. After initial
war funding cutoff provisions,249 he attempted a version of the minimizing
250
The institutional apparatus Congress had assembled against
interpretation.
the war directed oversight, criticism, and additional provisions upon the
executive position and overcame it.
The Vietnam War comparisons suggest why the current President will
be drawn to respond to Iraq war riders with dismissive statements and
minimizing interpretations. His party has a majority in both houses of
Congress. Moreover, the centralizing forces operating in that party since 1995
make it unlikely that strong majority leaders of full committees will emerge in
opposition in the way Chairman Fulbright did in 1966. Rather, since the
committee leaders support the President and oppose the position of those
pushing Iraq war riders on the floor, the committee leaders will use their
position to shield the executive branch against criticism, pressure, and political
consequences. They will arrange hearings in which the Administration has the
best opportunity to make its case. They will not use subpoena powers or
similar tools to uncover information that the Administration does not want to
make public, such as problems with the war or procurement scandals. Passage
of war spending bills would continue to be structured so as to involve the least
246
247

41 U.S.C. § 11 (1996).
An early opinion by the Attorney General took a narrow view. Support of the Army, 15
Op. Atty. Gen. 209 (1877).
248 For a broader view of the uses of the act, see Authority for the Continuance of
Government Functions During a Temporary Lapse in Appropriations, 43 Op. Atty. Gen. 293
(1981).
249 "President Nixon signed a 1971 military authorization bill, but objected to a provision
in it (the Mansfield Amendment, which set a fmal date for the withdrawal of U.S. Forces from
Indochina) as being 'without binding force or effect.'" Dellinger, supra note 235, at 345
(quoting Richard Nixon, PUB. PAPERS 1114 (1972».
250 His Defense Department continued the bombing war by transferring appropriations
from one account to another, and relied upon the position that the transferred appropriations
were not covered by the cutoff provisions. This was even given a fancy, albeit bogus, doctrinal
label by the State Department's legal adviser-the notion that these cutoffs could not serve as
"conditions subsequent."
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exposure to renewals of unwelcome floor amendments. Presidential
interpretation of the riders would receive formal and informal approbation,
obscuring their legal implausibility.
This institutional congressional assistance provides a wartime
President the ability to fend off powerful pressures to change policy. However,
acting on this ability may be deeply objectionable or even be a betrayal of
constitutional ideals. To take another noted example, in 1950 during the
Korean War, when President Truman cashiered popular General Douglas
MacArthur, the General initially appeared capable of pressuring the
251
The congressional committee
Administration into a more bellicose stance.
leaders of the same party as the President channeled MacArthur into closed
hearings, leading to the recognition of how his strategy could potentially lead
to World War III. The MacArthur bandwagon was effectively defused. Thus,
institutions of Congress can serve wondrously varied purposes.
B.

Counters to Presidential Undermining

It may seem completely beyond the reasonable scope of discussion to
begin detailing possible counters now, so far in advance of any actual
presidential efforts to undermine appropriation riders; but advance discussion
is sensible for multiple reasons. First, although some of the steps or arguments
previously discussed may not be familiar to the public, they are familiar to
knowledgeable figures in the executive and legislative branches. The
government runs on appropriations: their annual consideration takes up a fair
fraction of the attention Congress gives to enacted laws, and both supporters
and critics of Iraq policy, who deal with congressional affairs, understand the
significance of the appropriations process for funding war and aid to affect
policy.
Second, anticipation of the various steps impacts the earliest actions,
such as the initial drafting and debate on proposed riders. Proposal drafters
must strike a balance between language that will gain the broadest public
support and win over key members of the majority party and language that will
be least susceptible to being brushed off and minimized. Proposal opponents
will criticize both the basic thrust of the provisions and the aspects that either
help accomplish passage or deal with undermining them. For example, during
the mid-1980s, the Boland Amendments governing aid to the Nicaraguan
Contras went through a number of versions, often reflecting the new
Administration's political positions, such as the push to allow "humanitarian
aid.,,252
Yet once the Iran-Contra scandal broke, defenders of the
Administration cited the changing nature of the Boland Amendments as
making them too complex and shifting to obey, even though the changes were
largely made at Administration request. Notwithstanding the highly

251 General MacArthur appeared capable of directing strong national discontent with the
Truman Administration into a strategy of escalation toward war with China, including the use of
nuclear weapons. This alarmed even hawkish senators.
252
Peter Raven-Hansen & William C. Banks, Pulling the Purse Strings o/the Commander
in Chief, 80 VA. L. REv. 833, 861-65 (1994).
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sophisticated White House-centered group running the Iran-Contra operation,
this proved a useful defense.
There are various methods by which proponents of Iraq war riders can
counter presidential undermining: by including standards, loophole-closing
requirements, and watchdogs in the provision. First, to the extent congressional
provisions have concrete standards, Presidents have less room to minimize
their effect. A withdrawal provision that includes dates for some levels of
withdrawal, such as completion in no more than two years, will withstand
presidential minimizing better than a provision with no such dates. A policy
provision with specifics about reducing reservist combat exposure, such as
excluding reservists from the kinds of operations that exceed a specific level of
casualties in the previous year, will withstand presidential minimizing better
than a provision with no such specifics. This is particularly true of terms on aid
that require changes in Iraqi governance. A provision with specifics about
increasing the Sunni role in governance, such as reserving shares in certain
posts for Sunnis, will withstand presidential minimizing better than a provision
with no such specifics. So, provision drafters anticipating post-enactment
presidential minimizing will include specifics about what they wish, and
endure the inevitable criticisms that such detailed provisions constitute
"micromanaging," out of awareness that by doing so they have a greater
chance of affecting policy.
Second, provisions can include language imposing informational
requirements and closing loopholes, including those apparent either before the
process starts or after successive rounds of appropriation riders. For example,
the incessant criticism by presidential power proponents that these provisions
endanger the troopS253 will pressure some of the proposal-drafters either to
include the safety of the troops as a factor or to let the President waive the
provisions in the interest of national security when that has little effect on the
criticism. No one in Congress does, or could, fail to support the safety of the
troops. However, expressing that as a factor or, worse, as a basis for complete
waiver of the provision, opens the door for recapitulating how President Nixon
temporarily evaded constraints on expanding the Vietnam War. President
Nixon used arguments about the need to protect the troops from enemy
sanctuaries in Cambodia in order to sustain operations that were not actually
intended to promote troop safety, but in reality advanced the same policies of
conducting a wider war that the public and Congress had rejected. In the same
way, a President could rationalize operations in Iraq as intended to deal with
dangerous enemy sanctuaries when they, similarly, were primarily designed to
sustain a wider war that the public and Congress rejected. It may take a round
of presidential loophole-use before provisions are enacted to close them.
254
The
Similarly, provisions can include informational requirements.
key to implementation of congressionally-mandated policies consists of
obligating the President to inform Congress about the actual performance of
those policies. This matters most when, as now, the majority party is that of the
253

Recall how the Nixon Administration used this argument. Rehnquist, supra note 128,

at 638.

254 As to those informing powers
DIPLOMACY, supra note 1, at 295-313.

in this context, see
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President, because the chairs of the committees of jurisdiction are unlikely to
employ their ordinary nonstatutory powers to watch over the performance of
riders that they opposed.
Those with a practical view of the art of enacting provisions may scoff
at the notion of excess specifics and loophole-closing. They will point to the
daunting problems of enactment. The President and the majority floor and
committee leadership in both chambers will oppose such provisions, making
every step in their progress a siege. There is no gainsaying this problem. 255 It
suffices to recognize the difficult but necessary balance between shepherding
to passage a provision with inevitable compromises, and trying to keep it
robust enough to actually change policy.
Third, the provisions may include watchdogs. In the early 1980s,
President Reagan effectively nullified aid restrictions for countries like EI
Salvador and Guatemala that required certifications of human rights
improvements, by certifying to whatever the law required without regard to the
facts running counter to this certification. The partial solution in later rounds of
legislating consisted of having a watchdog body-in the Central American
case, a commission that provided independent fact-finding about human rights.
In terms of military withdrawal and policy conditions, creating express roles
for GAO scrutiny would help.256 Despite the criticism this draws from
presidential proponents, if the Administration certifies to implausible positions,
but the law gives the GAO a scrutinizing role that brings out truth, the press
coverage and congressional and public reaction will differ markedly from what
occurs without such a GAO role.
A concrete example from an Iraq aid rider highlights this point. When
President Bush persuaded Congress in 2003 to vote $18.2 billion in aid for
Iraq, some riders, albeit not the most important ones, went through. Notably,
the law created a special inspector general for the Coalition Provisional
Authority. By a clever interpretation, the Administration managed to end this
after a year. 257 Still, before that point it conducted a good deal of inspecting
and issued a number of critical reports that received press attention. So, putting
provisions for watchdogs in riders matters. Although they make it harder for
Congress to establish limits in Iraq that function effectively, the President's
powers to brush off or interpret away war and aid riders can be overcome by a
combination of good drafting and oversight.

255 Prying loose majority party members from their persuasive President and leadership
becomes the highest priority. Simplicity in expressing the public's goal in the provision
becomes vital. Every word in the proposed provision that makes it more of an affront to the
President and draws more criticism as straitjacketing the conduct of the war becomes a
vulnerability during those sieges and an obstacle to prying loose those majority party members.
256 The GAO has long had a lead role in watching over the performance of appropriation
terms and conditions. For example, during Iran-Contra the GAO ferreted out efforts by the
Reagan Administration to circumvent the restrictions on Defense Department activity by such
subterfuges as describing military construction activity as "temporary" work during field
exercises.
257 When the CPA transferred sovereignty to the new government of Iraq, the
Administration took the view that although the function performed by the special inspector
general would continue, it would abolish the specific post and move the operation into the State
Department. Thus, the able special inspector general came home.
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CONCLUSION

Some may wonder whether the difficult process of enacting
appropriation riders intended to speed our exit from Iraq is worth the effort.
We have seen that the proponents of strong presidential power will have
elaborate lines of constitutional argument to support their viewpoint. They will
distinguish away analogies from the legislation of the Vietnam War and the
Iran-Contra scandal and associate their legal position with great wartime
Presidents like Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt. Even if an appropriation rider
crosses the finish line and becomes law, the President may resist by brushing it
off or minimizing it. Seemingly, only disappointment and defeat lie in store for
appropriation rider supporters.
For most, the answer will consist of the policy substance of the
provision-that it offers hope of shortening a war they fear will otherwise
continue without end. Because this Article deals with constitutional processes,
it focuses on a different value upheld by the process of debate in consideration
and implementation of such riders. Far more than the public realizes, this is not
just how politics occurs, this is how our democracy decides about war, and this
is how our democracy has, over the centuries as well as in recent years, taken
form. During the struggle of Parliament with the Stuart monarchs, of the
colonies with their royal governors, and in the Constitutional Convention, a
recurring object shaped our democracy. It consisted of developing and
maintaining the process for the people, through their legislature, to decide both
on making war and on bringing it to an end. The struggles over riders and
conditions from Reconstruction to the onset of World War II showed that
neither the President nor Congress had a monopoly on wisdom about military
policy, and that a democratically acceptable policy could only take form by the
clash of arguments over riders attached to appropriations and legislation. The
end of the Vietnam War and the exposure of the Iran-Contra scandal, both
involving the enactment and implementation of riders, not only salvaged our
national policies, but strengthened democracy by subjecting those policies to
the public's wishes expressed in the rider process.
In sum, Congress has full authority to set terms of withdrawal through
the use of war funding riders, whether a war has debatable initial authorization,
like the Vietnam War combat in Cambodia and Laos, or clear initial
authorization, like the war in Iraq. Congress can define the limits of a limited
war and can do so by the terms in the funding appropriation.
We would not be in Iraq if intervention had lacked public support in
2002-03. And, constitutionally, we need neither stay longer nor employ a
different policy than what the public wants. If the American public has a will
to employ riders to speed our exit, the resulting healthy exercise of democracy
will furnish the way.

